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This paper examines the energy policy development of three European Union member states of Finland, Germany 
and Poland before and after the Ukraine crisis of November 21st, 2013. The theory of 
securitization/desecuritization/riskification is used to examine if the crisis caused any changes in the perception of 
Russian energy, and if this had an effect on the domestic energy policy choices of the three member states. This 
paper will also look if the Energy Union can be considered a Regional Security Complex, built around the 
perceived threat or risk of Russian energy, and if this will lead to greater integration or disintegration of the EU. 
This paper is structured as a comparative case study where all the three member states energy policy developments 
before and after the crisis are compared to each other and analyzed. 
 
This paper finds that all of the three member states had very similar reactions to the Ukraine crisis, but only 
Finland and Poland saw any true changes in their energy policy choice making. Finland riskified Russian energy 
(especially gas and oil) but maintained their bilateral energy relations with Russia through partly state-owned 
companies, with the most prominent project being the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project. Finland has begun 
to move towards reducing Russian fossil fuels from their energy base, and is transitioning towards domestic wood-
based biofuels, nuclear energy, renewables and energy connections with the Baltic states. Germany successfully 
desecuritized Russian energy after the crisis and continued their bilateral energy projects with Russia. The most 
prominent German-Russian energy project was the Nord Stream 2 project which like the Fennovoima project, is 
operated under state owned companies and has soured Germanys relations with Eastern EU member states. Polish 
reaction to the Ukraine crisis were the complete securitization of linked energy. The Polish government had 
overseen energy policy decisions in the past, but the crisis pushed them to take direct governmental control of 
energy policy and they intend to end the use of Russian energy altogether in the future. Poland also turned strongly 
against German energy policy line in the EU and has emerged as a staunch opposition to EU climate regulations, 
Nord Stream 2 project and bilateral energy trade with Russia. 
 
The Energy Union was shown not be a sign of a Regional Security Complex forming around Russian energy in the 
EU and will more likely lead to further disintegration of the EU energy policy as the conflicting energy security 
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Energy security has become one of the most discussed topics within the European 
Union (EU) in past few decades and has risen to challenge both economic and 
environmental views of energy policy. Many theorists have studied the rise of security 
politics within the EU, and in 2011 the former President of the European Commission 
José Manuel Durão Barroso talked how the European energy policy had a need for 
“Safe, secure, sustainable and affordable energy supply”1. In the past EU energy policy 
has stayed on the level of economic policy and not security policy2, and the member 
states all have had their own ways of handling their energy security. There is a strong 
internal division on how energy is perceived and member states perception of energy 
security can be affected by import dependency, energy intensity and the market strength 
of national energy companies3.  
 
The EU has always been a net-importer of energy, with 53.6% of the energy used in 
2016 coming from third countries4. The single largest importer of energy to the EU is 
the Russian federation, with 31.9% of the EU’s crude oil and 40% of natural gas coming 
from Russia in 20165. This energy dependency has often been dubbed the “Russia 
challenge”6 as Russian energy supplies are both vital to the EU’s economic growth, but 
Russia is not always seen as a reliable or trustworthy trading partner.  
 
During the first years leading up to what would become the Ukraine crisis the EU was 
preoccupied with the aftermath of the euro crisis and climate change mitigation which 
dominated the energy policy choice making of most of the member states. Russian gas 
disruptions of 2006 in Georgia and 2009 in Ukraine caused major fears in many EU 
member states that they too might have to face the possibility of energy disruptions, as 
most of EU member states are highly dependent on Russian oil or gas. The way that 
Russia uses their energy as an enforcement tool was dubbed “geoeconomics” which 
aimed to drive a wedge between EU member states by offering cheap and abundant 
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fossil fuels in exchange for political and economic favors7. The dependency on Russian 
energy became to be seen in many member states as a direct threat to their sovereignty 
and the EU saw a resurgence of energy security initiatives, mainly in the Eastern 
member states.  
 
The Ukraine crisis that began on November 21st of 2013 was the moment that changed 
the security situation in Europe, as for the first time since the breaking up of Yugoslavia 
there was an open conflict in Europe. The Russian challenge turned from being a 
looming problem into a serious security policy question for most EU member states, 
and there was a consensus within the EU that actions must be taken to counter Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine, but the question remained what should be done about Russian 
energy domination. 
 
In this study I will examine the energy policy development of three EU member states 
of Finland, Germany and Poland to see how the Ukraine crisis affected their energy 
policy development, and if the crisis led to greater energy policy integration in the EU. 
The Ukraine crisis works as a pivotal crisis moment that shows the different ways how 
member states handle energy security issues and formulate their energy policy 
accordingly.  The differences and similarities in national energy policy choice making 
processes are the key in understanding how a common EU energy policy can be created. 
The examination of energy policy choice making after the Ukraine crisis will also help 
to shed light on what are the vital energy systems of each state, and how far each state is 
willing to go to maintain energy security. 
 
This study will be done as a comparative case study, where I will track the energy 
policy development of each of the three-member states before and after the Ukraine 
crisis. The development of the energy policy decisions will then be analyzed to see if 
there are signs of securitization, riskification or desecuritization of energy policy. I will 
also use the Regional Security Complex Theory to see if the EU’s Energy Union project 
has been created from a unified fear of Russian energy, and if the project has the 
potential to develop into an EU wide regional security complex (RSC).  
 
                                                 





1.1 Research background 
The European Union was built on the same idea as its predecessor the European Coal 
and Steel Union that trade and free movement of goods is the way to not only create 
peace, but also to expand the Unions influence. Energy has been a public and private 
commodity in the EU which makes it both low and high politics. For most of the EU’s 
existence energy has been a part of low politics, and has been categorized as an 
economic commodity which is regulated by the markets and not by the EU itself. This 
might all, however, change as the Energy Union is said to move the EU's energy policy 
towards high political control and hard power, where the EU could use their 400-
billion-dollar single market as a geoeconomical tool to force their will when necessary. 
The Energy Union project has been called by its critics a protectionist enterprise, or 
even as a liberal mercantilist project8 which could move the EU away from a soft power 
market controlling regulatory state9, and towards a more direct hard power user.  
 
The Energy Union aims to increase the EU’s energy security and at the same time 
increase energy efficiency and decarbonification. There is, however, a continuous 
debate of what the Energy Union is and what it will become. Marco Siddi sees that the 
Energy Union has no clear strategy or objective how to achieve these goals, as the 
different EU member states all have their own energy policy paths 10 . In order to 
formulate a strategy for the Energy Union the EU member states need to find common 
concerns and goals which take into consideration the energy security concerns, vital 
energy systems, technical factors and socio-economic environments of the member 
states. Only then can the Energy Union truly begin to have a difference in re-enforcing 
EU’s energy security via energy policy harmonization and integration. 
 
1.1.1 Energy Security 
Energy security has been an important subject in the EU ever since 2006 and 2009 gas 
disputes, but it truly became part of the EU’s agenda after the Ukraine crisis. The 
Russian aggression, and the problems with gas negotiations raised concerns what would 
happen if the energy flows from Russia stopped coming. Energy security had been a 
major part of politics in many Eastern member states for years, so by opening energy 
                                                 
8 Andersen 2017, V 
9 Majone 1994; McGowan & Wallace 1996 





security as an agenda the EU was able to reassure many concerned states that they were 
taking the threat seriously.11  
 
The EU has tried to harmonize energy security via energy policy initiatives, with the 
Third Energy Package adopted in 200912 and the first steps towards the Energy Union 
being laid out in February 2015. The most radical step taken by the EU was in 2014, 
when they launched the European Energy Security Strategy 13  which simulated the 
possibility of a total gas import halt. The tests showed that if such a scenario would 
occur the results would be devastating. The goal was then set towards a more unified 
EU energy policy that would guarantee energy security of the entire EU which would in 
turn lead to the Energy Union project. But the question remained what could be done to 
increase energy security, and what energy security means for the EU? 
 
The most common answer to the question of what energy security in the EU is: 
“reliability of natural gas supply”14. This explanation does not, however, answer to the 
deeper and more convoluted questions of the nature of energy security, so alternative 
explanations of its true nature have emerged.  
 
The classical energy security definition was created by Daniel Yergin who sees energy 
security as “availability of sufficient energy supply at affordable prices.” which has 4 
dimensions: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability. 15  This 
explanation takes into account the more socio-economic dimensions of energy security 
and looks beyond the traditional military security dimension. The price and availability 
of energy are important aspects for any nation, but there are also the questions of energy 
supply and environmental issues that impact energy security. This definition is mostly 
used by energy consuming nations and not by energy exporters16. This definition is also 
used by the International Energy Agency (IEA)17. 
 
There are many other definitions that try to expand the idea of energy security to 
encompass all the necessary parts. One definition by Benjamin Sovacool states that 
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energy security can be defined as “how to equitably provide available, affordable, 
reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, properly governed and socially acceptable 
energy services.”18. This view allows the expansion of the energy security into other 
areas of study and allows to view all the competing issues that arise within energy 
security.  
 
Some definitions of energy security try to create a workable framework so that the level 
of energy security can be measured. The idea is to use indicators to depict issues and 
possible approaches which make up energy security. 19  These framework models, 
however, only function in single situations and are not useful when taken out of their 
original settings.  
 
Kacper Szulecki sees that a common EU energy policy can only be achieved if the 
perceptions of energy security are common. He supports the definition created by Aleh 
Cherp and Jessica Jewell of energy security as the “Low vulnerability of vital energy 
systems”20. This definition is very helpful in understanding the technical and socio-
economic dimensions of energy security, and it helps to simplify the meaning by 
bypassing policy-oriented definitions of the term. Lastly Szulecki states that the 
definition allows the critical observation of energy security.21 
 
Reliability and affordability are some of the main dimensions of energy security across 
nations. In practice energy security is usually seen as the same as security of supply 
(especially oil and gas)22. Many politicians and state officials bring out energy security 
in issues that have to do with energy stockpiles, and the utilization of domestic energy 
sources. Some also see energy security as being entwined with economic security, as the 
price and availability of energy causes both energy security and economic security 
issues23.  
 
Energy security can be thus divided into multiple segments that might affect it, such as: 
environmental concerns, infrastructure, supply, available energy sources, economic 
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concerns and energy dependency. Every part has its benefits and downsides, and this 
shows the difficulty of creating energy security. One can never have everything, and 
states create their own energy security definitions according to their own conditions. 
These conditions can also change, and new risks and threats might arise which have not 
been taken into consideration before. Therefore, the definition of “Low vulnerability of 
vital energy systems” of Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell is very useful. This simplified 
definition allows the studying of energy security from the view of energy systems and 
allows to see the development of the Energy Union by studying energy security 
concerns that arise from very different nations. The sudden shock of the Ukraine crisis 
helps to pinpoints the locations of the vital energy systems as the member states rush to 
secure their own energy security concerns as quickly as possible.  
 
1.1.2 The Energy Union 
The Energy union project was first introduced in 2014 24 , and finally launched in 
February 201525 by the European commission. The project was first brought up in the 
EU by the then Polish prime minister and the current president of the European council 
Donald Tusk, and was imagined as a way to harmonize and unify the energy policies of 
the EU member states. In the original idea the Energy Union was to be headed by the 
Vice-President of the Commission, who would function as a representative of the EU 
and negotiate the energy relations with third parties. Currently this view has not truly 
emerged, and the role of the vice-president is more of a voice of the Energy Union than 
its leader.26  
 
The “Russia challenge” is often seen as the original motivator for the Energy Union 
project. The Georgian and Ukrainian gas outages of 2006, 2009 and again in Ukraine in 
2013 were a wakeup call for the EU that their soft power approach was not working 
with Russia and in fact Russia was using its energy as a strategic tool27. The projects 
intention is to help the EU in four policy areas: diversify European energy sources and 
ensure energy security, unified and integrated energy market, create a more energy 
efficient system, lower the EU’s climate impact by reducing greenhouse gases and 
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finally to prioritize research and innovations of low-carbon and clean energy 
technologies.28 
 
The European commission saw that a common EU energy policy had to be based on the 
security of supply and economic affordability29. This security of supply and affordable 
price-oriented plan was later supplemented with new objectives of sustainability and 
climate change mitigation policy30. The main incentive for the Energy Union from the 
beginning has always been import dependency which the commission called as a 
fundamental structural weakness of the EU31. It is this weakness that was the beginning 
of the Energy Union, and the project has successfully brought many feuding member 
states together to formulate an EU energy and climate policy, but the question remains 
what the Energy Union truly is, and what it will become. 
 
There is a difficulty on the part of the member states to agree on the role and power of 
the Energy Union. Others want to see it as a more advisory body, that works together 
with member states in creating energy policy and does not harm the energy security of 
other member states. Others wish to see a more assertive and stronger Energy Union 
that enforces member states to stick with the EU energy and climate policy. The 
problems also stem from the different ideas of what aspects of energy security the EU 
wants to enforce. Climate change mitigation policy is often at odds with national energy 
security concerns of many states, and the EU has been criticized by many of being too 
focused on the mitigation of carbon emissions, rather than focusing on the more 
pressing concerns of import dependency and security of supply.32 
 
Currently the Energy union is only a strategic vision, meant to create an integrated EU 
energy market by pushing the member states to help each other in order to strengthen 
their energy security, create environmentally sustainable economies and bolster their 
energy efficiency. There is, however, a continuous debate between member states if 
decarbonification and energy security can both be achieved without harming the other. 
Eastern European states for example see energy security as a far more pressing matter 
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than climate friendly energy which they argue is not affordable.33 This study will try to 
see if the Russian energy domination has become a shared energy security concern 
among the member states after the Ukraine crisis, and if the Energy Union can help in 
securing the member states energy security. 
 
1.1.3 Formulation of research problem and tasks 
I will be studying energy policy development of the EU by focusing on three-member 
states, as there have been very little study of common EU energy policy and energy 
security development from the perspective of member states. The states that I will be 
looking at are Finland, Poland and Germany. I have chosen these member states as they 
all represent distinct aspects of EU member states, and they allow me to see how 
security and economic policies of very different states ended up forming the Energy 
Union, and how the member states perceive energy security and formulated their own 
energy policy before and after the Ukraine crisis.  
 
Finland is a Nordic nation which borders the Russian Federation, but it is not a 
NATO member state. Finland has very few domestic energy sources with a 
mainly nuclear and oil-based energy pallet with large possibilities to enlarge their 
production on wood-based bioenergy and nuclear power.  
 
Poland is a former Eastern bloc state with extensive energy grids and gas 
pipelines linking them to Russia. Their energy base is very heavily dependent on 
Russian imported natural gas and domestic coal. They are also a member of 
NATO and the Visegrad group 34 . They also border the Russian enclave of 
Kaliningrad.  
 
Germany is the largest user of energy in Europe and most of Russian gas and oil 
imported into the EU go to fuel the German industry. Germany is a NATO 
member state and arguably the most influential EU member state. Germany is 
trying to move towards total abandonment of coal and nuclear power and are 
trying to achieve total carbon neutrality with renewable energy. 
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Energy policy in the EU has clearly taken a step towards security policy, but the 
question remains how much, and how the member states differences in understanding 
and crating energy policies affect the development of the Energy Union? The Energy 
Union project was brought up before the Ukraine crisis, yet it has always been halted by 
the member states voting against it, as many member states feel uneasy about the EU 
meddling in their national energy policies, and some also wish to pursue bilateral 
energy deals with Russia.35 
 
The research questions that I will be studying are:  
1) How did the Ukraine crisis affect the national energy policy choices and the 
perception of Russian energy of Finland, Germany and Poland? 
2) Did the Ukraine crisis lead to a common EU RSC formation around the threat of 
Russian energy dependency, and is the Energy Union built to combat this threat? 
 
1.2 Logic of analysis 
This study will first describe the theory of securitization, desecuritization, riskification 
and the regional security complex. The energy policy development of the three member 
states will then be described from before the Ukraine crisis in November 2013 to after 
the crisis, ending at around the years 2017–2018. The energy policy developments will 
then be analyzed and compared to each other to see how the energy policy processes 
were affected by the crisis and has there been signs of a unified regional security 
complex forming within the EU around the perceived threat of Russian energy 
domination. I will be focusing my research on certain key national and EU energy 
projects, namely the Energy Union, Nord stream 2 and the Fennovoima Hanhikivi 
nuclear power plant projects.  
 
1.2.1 Data selection 
My data will comprise of primary data in the form of official publications by the IEA, 
Finland, Germany, Poland and the EU, such as reports, official documents and statistics. 
From the member states I will use official documentations and statistics from 
                                                 





governments, ministries and other government agencies. Secondary data will comprise 
of varied sources concerning energy and security policy, and include for example news 
articles, academic papers or statistics made by state and private researchers or 
institutions, corporations and other relevant sources.  
 
2 Theoretical framework 
It is important that the securitization/desecuritization/riskification of energy policy in 
EU member states can be studied and compared. The way that energy is perceived, and 
how it is created and carried out in member states can have major consequences on 
other states decision makers and the energy security of the entire EU. Cherp and Jewell 
see that the combination of securitization with the study of vital energy systems opens 
promising avenues for future research of energy security36. 
 
2.1 Securitization, desecuritization & riskification 
2.1.1 Securitization 
The work of Buzan and Wæver at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) 
put forward the concept of ‘securitization’37, focusing on how the invocation of the 
concept of security affects issues. For the Copenhagen School the forming of security 
issues had to be broadened to include other realms into the study of security other than 
states and military relations. Single actors within institutions can affect what becomes a 
security threat and a direct military threat is not the only way that a subject can be 
securitized. The sectors in international relations also do not act in isolation and affect 
one another38. The main idea of securitization studies is that security threats are socially 
constructed and studying of these processes makes it possible to view how security 
issues are formed and how they are diffused. It also gives the possibility to examine the 
impact that security issues have on policy making.  
 
Securitization is the process where a subject becomes an intentional matter of security, 
in the case of this study this would mean energy itself, especially energy linked to the 
Russian federation. This would show as the need for rapid actions taken to reduce 
energy dependency that do not follow general political processes, but instead take the 
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form of crisis politics. There are two types of threats to energy security: a shock 
(momentary) and stress (long term). A shock calls for resilience for the nation, whereas 
stress calls for robustness39. Energy might be removed from the political and public 
sphere into the security sphere for strategic reasons, to protect national sovereignty on 
energy policy40. The goal is to turn the subject into an issue that no longer needs to 
abide to normal political proceedings and can be made into a subject that needs quick 
and swift action.  
 
According to the classical Copenhagen school definition of securitization a successful 
securitization takes three steps: 1) The identification of the existential threat, 2) Action 
taken to prevent the threat, 3) Breaking free of rules41. The goal of securitization is to 
get the power to tackle the threat with any means necessary.  
 
Securitization happens when a subject is deemed a matter of security by the securitizing 
actor which in turn is accepted by the wider socio-political sphere. This is done 
according to Buzan through a speech act where an actor labels an issue to be a matter of 
security42. The key to the speech act is the level on which it is performed within society 
and does the target audience accept it or reject it. The issue cannot become securitized if 
there is no support for the securitization43. A speech act is usually formulated as an 
existential threat, and securitization has happened if the speech act spreads to wider 
discourse and is reproduced. The securitizing actor must understand their audience, as 
existential threats differ between societies and socio-cultural groups44. 
 
According to Mark Salter there are four possible types of audiences to securitization: 
popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific. The process of securitization is a lengthy 
political process between the securitizer and the audience. The level of securitization is 
important, as securitization can be accepted by one or more of the targeted audiences. 
The process of securitization could fail if the elite for example does not see the event as 
securitized, but the popular audiences do. Salter gives the example of climate change, 
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which has been securitized by scientific and technocratic audience in the United States, 
but it has not been securitized by the elite or the popular audiences.45 
 
Szulecki, however, sees that the speech act is not something that is necessarily needed 
when energy is being securitized, as according to him securitization is a mechanism, not 
a single event46. To find securitization in energy policy one needs to look at gradual 
movements of energy policy towards security policy during many years. Securitization 
is not an event, but and interpretation of an event47. From this view the securitizing 
actor points to a certain issue and turns it into an existential threat which needs a policy 
change in order to be confronted. This action changes the institutional and ideational 
contexts, and the political subject, and begins a slow process towards possible 
securitization48.  
 
There are those that argue that energy is not something that has or can be securitized. 
Jonna Nyman sees energy security as something that is often part of the political 
domain, and not securitizisable. Energy security can be discussed in normal politics and 
does not need exceptional measures49. Szulecki, however, does see energy as something 
that might be even more securitizisable than other policy areas. He argues that energy 
has a history of being ruled via “technocratic governance” and not by public scrutiny. 
Energy, according to Szulecki, is a policy area governed by a mix of governments, 
companies and other actors that rule over energy policy by making it an exception from 
traditional policymaking. This “exceptionalizing” of energy, might be understood as the 
same as “emergency measures” that makes up securitization.50 
 
Securitization is something that is debated if it is necessary and some even see 
securitization as a failure of traditional ways of politics51. Common security concerns do 
not always lead to further integration, rather it might cause the opposite; the 
strengthening of national sovereignty on energy policy and security. According to 
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Andrew Judge and Tomas Maltby the Energy Union project for example might not be 
strengthened because of securitization, but it might even be weakened by it.52 
 
2.1.2 Desecuritization 
Securitization can be overcome through desecuritization where actions are taken that try 
to lessen the imagined threat of the subject of securitization and move the subject back 
into the realm of normal politics. A successful desecuritization keeps the subject within 
the rules of the system, and the actors stop treating each other as security problems and 
begin to see each other as friends. There still are challenges and competition but any 
problems are dealt with normal politics.53 
 
 If a subject moves completely into this level of desecuritization it will eventually leave 
the realm of security all together54 . This level of desecuritization is, however, un-
realistic, and even as the EU is a desecuritizating actor in most cases, even it is not 
immune to securitizing moves within its own political system. Desecuritization can lead 
to either normal politics or a securitizised event moving into riskification or it might fail 
to lessen the perceived threat.55 Desecuritization is often seen as the more positive and 




Although securitization has been used in a wide variety of energy policy studies, a 
common feature has emerged where many doubt the usefulness of the Copenhagen 
school version of securitization when studying energy.  
 
Multiple studies have shown that the Copenhagen schools’ idea of securitization is 
either extremely rare, or that the theory of securitization is far too exclusive to include 
events that divert from the Kopenhagen school version of securitzation.57  The key 
problem is that it is focused on a single logic of security; based on existential threat. 
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Security is often pluralistic in nature and not based on a single issue.58 The second 
problem is that securitization does not take into consideration the possible contextual 
factors; such as established power structures or institutional structures. Securitization 
that does happen in one nation might not happen in another even under the same 
circumstances because the state has different ways of creating their policy or that the 
internal conditions vary significantly.59 Olaf Corry critizises securitization theory for 
not specifying how the audience, sociological conditions and choice of policy tools 
affect the outcome of the securitizing move.60 
 
There are technical and political-economic factors that affect energy issues: Technical 
factors such as transit networks, sources of the energy and the role of particular energy 
types are highly path dependent and need a lot of time and money to change. Technical 
factors constrain possible future actions and shapes them. Political-economic factors are 
special conditions within nations, such as how energy is traded and bought under 
specific rules and regulations. These conditions make up the energy market system of 
the nation. This creates a structure that guides the interactions of the actors. There are 
state-led (the state regulates the market participants according to their political will), 
market-led systems (market participants are the primary actors) and mixed systems.61 
 
To better understand and take these factors into consideration Olaf Corry distinguishes 
between securitization and what he called “riskification”62. Riskification means that 
“exceptional measures are made permanent and introduced to deal with merely 
potential, hypothetical and less-than-existential dangers” 63 . Whereas securitization 
happens to combat imminent and existential threats, riskification is aimed at combating 
long term ‘risks’. These future scenarios need to be diffused and prevented by riskifying 
a certain policy area. 64  When a certain subject becomes riskified it is constantly 
reflected to other policy areas and affects all future policy decisions.65 There are some 
theorists that see riskification as a possible pathway to securitization, where piece by 
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piece the society is securitized so that possible risks can be controlled.66 Every nation 
has their own areas of political-economic and technical areas that are the weak part of 
their security which constitutes a possible risk. These areas might take time and 
resources away from other areas and block any other possible areas from being 
securitized or riskified. For example, the updating of the nation’s entire energy grid 
might take priority over greenhouse gas reduction. 
 
A key difference between risks and threats is that a risk does not need to be an 
existential threat that needs to be real and imminent. A subject becomes riskified when a 
riskifying actor is able to convince the audience that the parts and conditions that can 
cause a future crisis exist, and that to stop it from ever materializing it needs constant 
supervision and priority status over all other policy areas.67 Securitization includes a 
plan of action to defend against the threat, and riskification includes a plan to govern the 
parts and conditions that make up the risk.68 When a subject starts to move towards 
riskification it is first constructed as a risk towards a certain governable object, in this 
study’s case energy security or the security of supplies. The state will then try to boost 
up the resilience of the governable object. Lastly riskification will include the 
legitimization of the precautionary methods, for example a safety margin which makes 
riskification far less drastic than securitization.69 
 
Olaf Corry sees securitization/riskification logic as a good way to study energy security, 
as energy policy issues are more often risks than threats. Riskification does not replace 
securitization, as they both have their advantages and disadvantages. Riskification can 
also lead to securitization. All in all, securitization, riskification and desecuritization 
create a triad where an issue can move between the three if the necessary actions and 
conditions apply.70  
 
2.2 Regional security complex 
The second theory I’m using is Barry Buzans and Ole Wævers Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSCT). The theory has shown how the EU formed it’s desecuritizing 
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ways during the Cold War, by having to balance between two superpowers, and rather 
than trying to directly side with one, the EU decided to avert another conflict in Europe 
by staying as neutral as possible. The end of the Cold War had a massive impact overall 
international security sphere, and rather than weakening RSC’s the end of the cold-war 
accelerated the process71. The lack of superpowers made regions more susceptible to 
interregional rivalries and allowed local powers to make their security threats into 
RSC’s72 . EU was, according to Buzan and Wæver, “Set free” to create their own 
security agenda which quickly lead to the formation of multiple different security 
issues73. 
 
The RSCT sees that security spreads more easily within regions than internationally, 
and different actors within the region all have their own national or local security 
threats. These security complexes are subsystems of states within the international 
system whose major security concerns are inextricably linked. This can lead to a slow 
but sure level of securitization within the area, when the securitization of an issue in one 
regional actor leads to the same issue to be securitized within the entire region. RSCT is 
both a materialist and constructivist approach, with ideas of bounded territorial and 
neorealist distribution of power and with constructivist ideas of politically constructed 
securitization74.  
 
The definition of an RSC is a “set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another“ 75 . The definition was 
conceived to shed the state centric view of the RSCT and allow a more global and 
institutional use to be possible. Classical security analysis is dominated by national and 
global levels, but Buzan argues that there is no nation which security is self-contained, 
and the fears and aspirations of neighboring states affect the security of an entire 
region76. These threats, however, can be passed on, and once a certain security threat 
has grown enough that threat becomes a shared one within the region. This would 
explain the long and slow development of a unified EU energy policy, and the sudden 
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rapid development of the Energy Union project; the issue had been a small-scale 
security threat in some member states before rapidly expanding to become an EU wide 
securitized issue.  
 
The EU can be classified as a centered RSC which has been unified by an institution 
rather than a state (e.g Russia). The EU is hard to compare to other regions, and it can 
be viewed either as a unified RSC or as an RSC in security community form. A security 
community is a Deutscian definition where states that are actors cannot imagine a war 
among each other77. This idea has been the core idea behind EU’s development and has 
been achieved by economic integration and due political processes. The EU has 
securitized their expansion and integration, as the EU sees that the only way to secure 
peace in the region is the constant expansion and development of the EU, but many 
member states see that this development could also be seen as a security threat to their 
economic and political sovereignty. As a security community the EU’s main method of 
tackling issues is desecuritization where as the main dynamic of a RSC is 
securitization78. EU has shown signs of this desecuritization in their actions, as in the 
past political, economic, environmental and societal problems have not been securitized 
but have been dealt with classical political action, not as security issues. As a regulatory 
state the EU is naturally slow to change, so an RSC would also explain the reason how 
such a sudden change in policy could be possible, especially when considering the 
differences that the different EU member states, institutions and organizations have. 
Buzan and Wæver also point out that the EU still hasn’t created a unified RSC, but if 
the Energy Union project has been caused by some level of RSC formation then the EU 
has moved towards greater integration in security policy.  
 
The RSCT, according to Buzan and Wæver is useful in studying international relations 
for three reasons: “First it tells us something about the appropriate level of analysis in 
security studies, second it can organize empirical studies, and third, theory-based 
scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible forms of, and 
alternatives to, RSCs.”79. Insecurity and proximity are interlinked so the study of two 
regions (EU and Russia) allows to examine how their actions affect the regions. The 
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member states should then show signs of increasing insecurity with their proximity to 
Russia.  
 
The key in studying this relationship is to start within the regions themselves, and study 
the member states by examining four variables: 1) Boundary (where does one region 
end, and another begin), 2) Anarchic structure (The RSCT must be comprised of two or 
more autonomous units), 3) Polarity (The distribution of power among the units, 4) 
Social construction (the patterns of amity and enmity among the units). From these 
variables you can make three predictions on how the RSCT develops: 1) Maintenance 
of status quo which means that the structure does not change, 2) Internal transformation 
which means that the changes that occur happen within the region and can be processes 
of integration, disintegration or changes in amity or enmity, 3) External transformation 
which means that the changes happen beyond the boundary of the region either by the 
boundary being moved either by the RSCT being split or being merged with another 
region80. 
 
3 Methodological framework 
Methodologically this study is a comparative case study, with the Ukraine crisis as the 
main case. I will use the securitization/desecuritization/riskification of energy policy in 
EU member states to the case of the Ukraine crisis, and compare the energy policy 
development of the member states to see if a common EU energy policy moved towards 
greater integration or division. I will also see if there are signs that RSC’s have formed 
within the EU after the crisis. 
 
In the next three chapters I will look chronologically at the energy policy development 
of Finland, Germany and Poland. These chapters will help to show the development of 
the energy policy in these states. The data used in these chapters vary according to the 
national differences and special characteristics of the member states energy policy 
decision making.  
                                                 







In 2015 Finland had a population of 5.48 million, and the capital city of Helsinki had a 
population of little over 626 000. Other major metropolitan areas include Espoo, Vantaa 
and Tampere. Finland has a 1 340 km border with the Russian federation, a 614 km 
border with Sweden and a 727 km border with Norway.81 
 
Finland has one of the lowest population densities (18 people per square kilometer) of 
all EU member states82. The country is, however, highly industrialized and has very 
large and developed high-tech manufacturing, electronics, chemical, forestry and paper 
industries. The energy policy of Finland is also influenced by the lack of natural 
resources, long winters and geographical limitations that make it very difficult for the 
country to connect to European energy markets83. Finland is, however, a part of the 
Nordic electricity market, together with Sweden, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Lithuania, 
Estonia, The United Kingdom and Denmark, called Nord pool84.  
 
Energy security is one of the most important aspects the Finnish governments concerns, 
as the country is extremely dependent on imported fossil fuels and energy transit 
infrastructures to the rest of the EU remains weak. This poses a major challenge for 
security of supply, and the Finnish government has ruled that Finland must maintain an 
energy reserve in the case of a crisis situations, and the basis for the security of supply 
of energy is in diversification, decentralization and efficiency in energy production85. 
 
The Finnish energy policy sphere has been influenced by the EU energy policy ever 
since the country joined the European Union in 1995, and the countries energy policy 
legislation is strongly integrated with that of the EU86. One of the main energy policy 
areas that has been influenced by the EU is decarbonization of energy. Finland takes an 
active role in the fight against climate change and has ratified both the UN Kyoto 
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protocol and the Paris climate agreement in 2016 87 . Finland follows the EU 2030 
climate and energy framework presented to the commission in 22 January 2014 and 
launched in October 201488. Together with all other EU member states Finland has 
agreed to three targets for the year 2030: 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels, 27% share for renewable energy and 27% increase in energy efficiency. 
The new 2030 climate and energy strategy builds on the 2020 climate and energy 
package which had the targets of 20% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% EU 
energy from renewables and 20% improvement in energy efficiency. The Finnish 
governments 2030 energy and climate strategy projections indicate that nuclear energy 
will have a major future role in the country’s energy supply, increasing to 38.4% of 
TPES.89 
 
The Finnish energy policy has always aimed at reduced energy imports, and the 
strengthening of self-sufficiency and energy efficiency. Diversification of energy 
supplies is particularly strong in Finland with renewable, nuclear and hydrocarbon 
energy each comprising roughly one third of the country's energy production. The 
expansion of nuclear power facilities is particularly important in Finland as it allows the 
diversification and self-production of energy without greenhouse emissions. Compared 
to other European countries Finland has a particularly large renewable energy 
production, but because of the cold winters (25% of energy goes to heating), dispersed 
population, industry and high living standards the energy consumption per-capita is the 
highest in the European Union.90 
 
The Ministry of Economic affairs and Employment (MEE), is the main government 
body overseeing energy policy in Finland.  MEE’s Energy Department consists of five 
divisions:  Energy Markets Division, Emissions Trading Division, Energy Efficiency 
and Technology Division, Nuclear Energy Division and Renewable Energy Division. 
MEE work with other ministries to form Finnish energy policy, including finance, the  
environment,  transport  and  communications,  agriculture  and  forestry and  foreign  
affairs  (international  co-operation).91 Finland outlines its energy policy in the MEE’s 
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national energy and climate strategy, the latest versions published in 20.3.2013 and 
24.11.2016. 
 
The Finnish energy security is strongly influenced by the economic sphere. Finland’s 
significant energy dependency on Russia (70% of energy imports) has been justified by 
the economic profitability of this trade to both parties, and security threats are often 
played down or accepted for economic reasons. Finland is, through many different 
links, tied to economic dependencies. Neste Oy and Fortum Oyj are both partly owned 
by the Finnish state and are linked with Russian gas and oil trade, and also to large 
energy projects such as the Nord Stream 2 project and the Fennovoima nuclear power 
plant project. This places Finland in a situation where continuing energy cooperation 
with Russia is economically viable but precarious for the energy security of the nation.92 
The Finnish partly state-owned energy company Fortum has a 14.1% market share in 
the energy market.93 
 
4.2 Statistics 
Finland produces approximately half of its energy supply, with total domestic 
production being 17.1 Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) 94  in 2011. In 2011 
renewable energy sources contributed 26.5% of TPES95 followed by oil 26.4%, nuclear 
power 17.4%, coal 11.6%, natural gas 9.7% and peat based power plants produced 5.8% 
of supply.96  In 2016 the TPES of renewable energy was 32%, oil was 26%, nuclear 
power contributed for 18% of TPES, with coal use dropping to 9% and natural gas use 
dropping to 6%. The biggest renewable energy sources in Finland are biofuels, wind 
and hydro power.97   
 
Finland has very little natural reserves of fossil fuels, with no natural coal, gas or oil 
reserves. Finland does have uranium deposits but currently there is no domestic mining 
                                                 
92 Tynkkynen & Pynnöniemi & Höysniemi 2017, 7 
93 International energy agency 2013a, 9 
94 A unit of energy defined as the amount of energy released by burning one tons of crude oil. 
Abbreviated as Mtoe from now on. 
95 Total primary energy supply is the total amount of energy of production and imports of energy, after 
subtracting exports and storage changes. 
96 International energy agency 2013a, 15 





or enriching. The country's energy is thus generated from imported fossil energy 
sources, renewables and nuclear power from imported uranium.98 
 
Oil is the primary energy source used in Finland, with over a quarter of the country’s 
total energy supply generated from oil-based energy sources99. Although divided into 
small groups, renewable energy is a rising energy source in Finland, and Finland plans 
to grow its share of renewable energy sources to 50% of all energy production by 2030, 
decrease energy dependency by diversifying its energy production base and reaching a 
level of self-sufficiency in energy to 55%. The 2030 climate strategy also calls for the 
phasing out of coal-based energy production and halving the use of oil. Finland is one 
of the only IEA countries with active plans to expand nuclear power facilities, and the 
country has a goal of reaching 60% share in nuclear power electricity production by 
2030. The Finnish parliament plans to build two more nuclear power plants in the 
future, and if these projects are completed, the amount of nuclear energy in Finland 
could double by 2025100. Compared to other IEA countries natural gas makes up a very 
small percentage of Finland’s energy base.101 
 
In 2011 Finland imported around 77.8% of their TPES, of which 64.2% was oil, 17% 
coal and 12.4% natural gas. The Russian Federation was the main country of import, 
with 88.9% of oil, 100% of natural gas and 75.3% of coal coming from Russia.102 All 
uranium used in Finnish nuclear power plants is imported, with the supplier ranging 
from western to Russian companies103. In 2016 45.33% of Finnish energy was imported, 
with 12.2 Mt of imports being oil of which 88.1% came from the Russian federation. 
Finland also imported 2,5 Bcm of Gas of which 100% came from Russia.104  
 
4.3 Finnish energy policy before the Ukraine crisis 
The Euro crisis of 2009 caused major shifts in Finnish energy policy, as Finland needed 
rapid structural changes to reach the necessary EU energy efficiency targets and reduce 
their share of greenhouse gas emissions. This resulted in the reduction of the use of 
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fossil fuels, and the reduction of total emissions. In 2011 Finland was on track to reach 
all EU climate goals on all policy fronts. In terms of longer-term strategy Finland had 
decided to develop renewable energy and nuclear energy power solutions to combat 
both energy dependency and climate change.105 
 
In 2011 Finland's energy policy was guided by the 2008 climate and energy strategy, the 
UN Kyoto protocol of 2005, and the European Commission's 2011 Energy 
Roadmap.106The EU’s energy policy framework was interlinked with Finland’s own 
energy targets, and the 2020 targets and the third package for the EU internal energy 
market of 2009, being particularly important.107 
 
In 2012 Prime minister Jyrki Katainen emphasized the need for renewable energy and 
nuclear power, to strengthen domestic energy production and reduce Russian import 
dependency. Renewable energy alone, he argued, would not be enough to fill the energy 
gap after coal power would be phased out 108 . When the newly appointed Finnish 
President Sauli Niinistö made his first foreign visit to Germany in November 2012, one 
of the main talking points of the visit was bilateral energy relations. He saw that both 
Finland and Germany are trying to develop new renewable energy systems and should 
not do so alone.109 
 
Emissions generated in Finland in 2011 were 6% below the targets in the Kyoto 
Protocol, and they were dropping every year between 2011 and 2013. The Katainen 
government even saw that the European Union’s present emissions target for 2020 were 
not enough, and the emissions reduction targets should be raised to 30%. Although 
Finland was able to reduce energy consumption between the years 2008-2012, and 
easily reached the EU and UN goals on greenhouse emission reduction, the country was 
still not self-sufficient when it came to energy and was dependent on imported energy in 
winter. The plan was to make Finland completely self-sufficient in energy by 2020, by 
updating the climate and energy strategy of 2008, by the year 2013.110  
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One of the major energy projects going on at this time was the Fennovoima Hanhiki 
nuclear power plant project, started in 2007 and approved by the Finnish government in 
2010. The project had at first been a joint project between the Finnish governments part-
owned energy company Voimaosakeyhtiö SF and the German energy company E.ON. 
In 2012 E.ON decided withdraw from the project and sold all of their shares (34%). 
This all happened as the process of finding provider for the nuclear reactor was still 
under way. Both the French nuclear power company Areva and the Japanese Toshiba 
companies were interested in providing the Hanhikivi plant with a reactor, but as the 
Russian government owned Rosatom's sister company Rosatom Overseas decided to 
buy the shares sold by E.ON in 2013, Fennovoima decided to grant Rosatom the rights 
to provide the reactor.111 This, however, was a problem as the original permit for the 
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant was given to Voimaosakeyhtiö SF and E.ON, and not 
Rosatom.112 The project was thus put on hold as the process needed to be approved by 
the government and the parliament in 2014113.  
 
In 2012 energy policy was a major part of foreign and security policy in Finland. 
Energy security was strongly coupled with climate policy, and environmental factors 
had a strong influence on energy policy choice making.114 The main framework of 
Finnish defense policy in 2013 was to have good bilateral relations with Russia, and 
work with the EU in broad international and regional cooperation. Globalization, non-
state actors, population growth and climate change were mentioned as the most pressing 
issues in the security environment of Finland in 2013.115 The relations with Russia were 
extremely important and being Finland’s largest trading partner, it was crucial to 
maintain political dialogue and cooperation between authorities. Although seen as rivals 
by the Finnish Prime Minister’s office, the EU and Russia were believed to be mutually 
interdependent of one another through trade. 116  Finland’s energy security was 
threatened by local and global competition over vital energy resources, but the 
consensus was that the trading of energy with Russia was necessary and beneficial to all 
sides.117  
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In early 2013 energy dependency was a major concern of the government. It was, 
however, seen that once the Olkiluoto 3 and the Fennovoima nuclear power plants came 
operational and the dispersal of energy production was achieved, the problem would be 
alleviated. 118  It was understood, however, that even with the new energy sources 
Finland would still be way below the European average in energy sufficiency. This, the 
government hoped, would be alleviated with the introduction of new renewable energy 
technologies, and economically this was a possibility for Finnish high technology 
industries. The development and use of biofuels were seen as a way for Finland to 
reduce fossil fuel use, reach the EU climate goals and gain a new form of domestic 
wood-based energy industry that would be complemented by nuclear energy.119 
 
In March 2013 under the government of Jyrki Katainen the long-term objective was a 
carbon-neutral society by the year 2050.120 In 2013 there were concerns in the Finnish 
government that the availability and price of energy might be at a risk, as the rising 
economies of China and India were entering the global energy markets with force, and 
the International Energy Agency anticipated that the price of oil will stay high, or even 
increase considerably. There were also risks related to the stability of the international 
market system. The goal for Finland in the EU context was to help in the development 
of shale gas infrastructure and liquefied natural gas (LNG) which was seen as the 
solution to rid Finland of all Russian natural gas dependency. Finland had also begun 
the planning of a gas pipeline called the baltciconnector which was planned to become 
operational in 2019. The project was mainly funded by the EU and would connect 
Finland to the Baltic gas market121. The coal markets and supply were stable, but the 
climate impact of fossil fuels and the subsequent EU restrictions and taxes on its use 
made them, in the Finnish government's eyes, a non-attractive energy source and all use 
of coal was planned to be phased out.122 
 
4.4 Finnish energy policy after the Ukraine crisis 
The Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea changed the security situation 
in Europe, and according to the Finnish government a military threat to Finland was 
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now possible, and Russia had become a threat to both Finland and to Europe. The 
Finnish government emphasized the role of the EU in the crisis as an essential and 
important security community that had to stand united against Russian aggression.123 
This view was echoed by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign affairs in their 2015 review 
on Finland’s security cooperation, where a united EU response was seen as the answer 
to not only against Russia’s aggression, but for comprehensive threats such as energy 
security, cyber security and terrorism 124 . Both the war in the Donbass and the 
annexation of Crimea were strongly condemned by the Finnish government, but even 
though Russia is stated as a military threat Finland still advocated for bilateral dialogue 
and economic cooperation to continue125. The government even saw Russia's isolation 
as a negative development and called for the EU and Russia to allow diplomatic 
solutions to the crisis126. Finland’s energy cooperation with Russia was still extremely 
important, but now its continuation had to be interconnected with the development of 
the EU’s Energy Union and the peace process in Ukraine.127 
 
According to the research done by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA in 
January 2015 the Finnish public’s view on Russia had become more threatened128. Over 
83% saw that Russia had become unstable, and 50% thinking that they were a military 
threat. However over 87% saw Russia still as an important trade partner. Many experts 
in Finland were, however, more worried about the Finnish economy than immediate 
security threats, as the fear was that Russian energy trade would stop if relations 
between the EU and Russia would continue to deteriorate.129  
 
According to Jussi Laine the debate of the future Finnish-Russian relations grew in 
Finland, and the lack of consensus on Russia was new to Finnish security policy, as 
there had for decades been a common view of the relationship. Finland had always 
wanted to stay on the good side of Russia and maintain their position as a country with 
special relations with Russia. Because the Ukraine crisis had started when the Ukrainian 
government had dropped plans on forming closer trade ties with the EU, Finland saw 
the conflict as a conflict between the EU and Russia, but as an EU member state Finland 
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could not go their traditional route and formulate good relations with Russia on their 
own. 130  Although majority of the population and political elite endorsed the EU 
sanctions against Russia, there were signs that Finland was not as unified on the matter 
as many other EU member states. Although the insecurity and fear of Russia was rising, 
and single politicians and academics were concerned of a military threat to the country, 
the official Finnish position soon dropped the possibility of a direct Russian threat131. 
The Finnish President Sauli Niinistö met with the Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei 
Lavrov in June 2014. In the following press release he saw that the Finnish-Russian 
relations were not in trouble, but that there were external and momentarily difficulties 
between the EU and Russia132. 
 
Finnish actions were, however, different than their words. Finland boosted their defense 
budget, forged closer military partnerships with other Nordic states and strengthen ties 
with NATO. The Finnish army and border guards were on a 24/7 watch, and the Finnish 
air forces increased air force readiness. The Finnish army even sent letters to over 900 
000 reservists updating them on their war time role.133 
 
Even after the Ukraine crisis caused fear in Finland, it was still seen that nuclear power 
cooperation was an important part of promoting good relations with Russia134. It first 
seemed that the Fennovoima nuclear power plant project would not get the necessary 
60% EU ownership majority it needed, as there were difficulties to get domestic or EU 
investment. In a surprise twist the Finnish state-majority owned energy company 
Fortum decided to invest in Fennovoima and fulfilled the needed 60% domestic 
ownership quota.135 The 60% EU based ownership was finally confirmed, even after it 
was discovered that Russia was using a Croatian dummy company to reach the 
ownership criteria136. There were also some sudden political shifts within Finland with 
the former Minister of Economic Affairs Olli Rehn supporting the project, even though 
he had at first been against it. He had even said that the project could had been shut 
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down in 2015 which could have had disastrous consequences for Finnish-Russian 
relations, as at the same time Finland had, as according to the EU sanctions, refused to 
grant visas for Russian diplomats to take part at the meeting of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.  It was after Rehn’s trip to Moscow that the 
Finnish state-owned energy company Fortum took part in the project.137  
 
The role of nuclear power continued to be a highly contested issue in Finnish politics 
after the Ukraine crisis. Finland’s plan to continue the Fennovoima Nuclear power plant 
deal with Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom caused major political upheaval in 
Finland, as the Green League party left the government when the nuclear power plant 
deal was approved by the parliament in December 2014. The main reasons were the 
feared influence of Russia on Finnish energy policy, but also the environmental and 
health fears associated with nuclear power. 138 
 
The possible energy security risks or even threats that might come from the Fennovoima 
project were raised in other spheres of Finnish state and society as well. According to 
Toivo Martikainen and Antto Vihma Russia's nuclear energy strategy is to offer cheap 
alternatives to other energy source's to strategically valuable countries, and the 
Fennovoima project is often seen as an attempt of Rosatom to get good reputation in the 
West, the main reason being the approval of the radiation and nuclear safety authority of 
Finland; Stuk139. Doctor Katri Pynnöniemi and Sinikukka Saari listed the Fennovoima 
nuclear power plant as a sample case of the strategic use of energy resources as a 
“carrot” to cause division within the EU member states and expand Russian energy 
domination in new areas and continue using energy as a way to achieve political 
goals140. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service warned in their 2015 report that 
foreign intelligence services are trying to influence the Finnish political environment, 
influence the Finnish public opinion on NATO and the EU sanctions and influence the 
energy policy decisions in the country141.  
 
Prime Minister Stubb talked to the parliament on the 7th of October 2014 about the 
direction that the government was taking Finnish energy policy. In his opening speech 
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he said that in the Finnish view energy policy is climate, economic and employment 
policy, but it also is security of supply, self-sufficiency and EU foreign & security 
policy. The biggest energy related threat which he brought up was climate change which 
would be countered with energy efficiency and nuclear power. These changes would 
also strengthen Finland’s self-sufficiency and competitiveness. The second point was 
the economic dimension of energy policy in which Stubb said Finland has not kept up 
with other EU states. The third point in Stubb’s speech was the global situation, namely 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine which he said has raised foreign and security policy issues 
in Finnish energy policy. He saw that future risk analysis must take into consideration 
the possibility that energy could be used as a geoeconomic tool against Finland. The 
best course of action, according to the Prime Minister, would be the phasing out of coal, 
gas, oil and imported electricity, and replace them with domestic renewable energy and 
nuclear power. The Fennovoima plant, he argued, is a domestically owned energy 
project as it reached the necessary 60% EU ownership criteria. Stubb argued that the 
Fennovoima project will reduce Finnish dependency on Russian energy and strengthen 
domestic energy production. The Balticconnector pipeline would also give Finland an 
alternative source of natural gas, together with LNG terminals. The following comments 
made by political parties and MEP’s showed that the issue of nuclear power, the future 
of bioenergy and economic sanctions on Russia were all highly contested issues. The 
conservative party was critical of Russian economic sanctions, especially when Finland 
was engaged in a nuclear energy project with Rosatom. The green league saw nuclear 
energy and Russia both with equal distrust, and the center party saw that domestic 
bioenergy must be developed further, and that energy imports from Russia must be 
brought down. All parties saw that coal, natural gas and oil use must be reduced 
considerably, to protect both the security of supply and to reach greenhouse gas 
reduction goals.142 
 
In 2015 the MEE finished their report issued by the then Prime Minister Alexander 
Stubb in 26.4.2014. The report looked at the alternatives to Finnish energy policy and 
was drafted after the Ukraine crisis began. The main goal of this review was to look at 
renewable energy and the promotion of decentralized energy production. The focus was 
economic; strengthen Finnish competitiveness in the energy markets, but there were 
also mentions of other goals such as strengthen the nation's energy self-sufficiency and 
                                                 





taking climate goals into consideration. 143  The report sought to shed light on new 
alternative sources of hydrocarbon energy (wood-based fuels, biofuel, wind, gas) and 
enhance Finland’s energy transportation. The report sees that Finland must try to move 
away from coal power, and as old power stations are taken off the grid the question of 
the security of supply and the reserve energy production capabilities become clear. The 
Finnish gas policy is one of decentralization, alternative sources and free market 
competition; Russia could no longer be the sole provider and Finland would continue 
the plans to create a joint Finnish Estonian Baltic connector gas pipeline. If the Baltic 
connector pipeline will not materialize, then Finland will go on its own national natural 
gas policy route and will not be a part of the EU's internal energy market.144 The report 
also paints the European energy union as a result of the Ukraine crisis, and as a 
necessary project to strengthen EU energy security. The Ministry saw that the execution 
of the set targets in the EU's 2030 climate and energy package were essential to the 
Energy Union, especially energy efficiency and alternative fuel sources.145 
 
The environmental goals of the Finnish government were still in place after 2013, and 
the 16th of October 2014 Energy and Climate Roadmap had the goal of making Finland 
a carbon neutral nation by 2050. The main points in the roadmap were: 1) Energy self-
sufficiency and the security of supply. This will be achieved via renewables and energy 
efficiency. This will also have a positive effect on the economy. 2) the amount of 
renewables to make up 50-60 % of TPES by 2050. 3) Forest biomass to be used as 
renewables. This will help the Finnish forest industry and it is useful for Finland to 
switch from fossil fuels to domestic biofuels. 4) Small dispersed energy option must be 
supported.146 In 2015 the Parliament accepted the government's proposal for a new 
climate change bill that commits to 80% emissions reductions by 2050. 147  Climate 
change was singled out as the major global threat in 2016, and the Paris agreement was 
hailed by the Finnish Prime minister Juha Sipilä as a landmark achievement in the fight 
against global warming, and the process of moving from fossil fuels to renewables was 
seen by Sipilä as a tool to shift the economic and political power of the world148.  
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The Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipilä outlined his  government's objectives in the 
strategic document issued in 2015 in which he argues that good relations with Russia 
are in the best interest of the EU, but good relations cannot be restored before Russia 
respect international law and Ukraine's territorial integrity.149 Sipilä also saw in his 
speech during the parliamentary discussion on foreign policy on the 20th of October 
2015 that the relations between the EU and Russia are in a difficult situation, but the 
relations of Finland and Russia are strained but ultimately good. The Prime Minister 
also emphasized the importance of Russia as an economic partner.150 
 
When Neste Oy dropped out of the Nord stream 2 project, Finland was left with the 
question if the project should be allowed to be built in its territorial waters, and if 
Finland should endorse or reject it in the EU. Even though some Finnish members of 
the European parliament from the conservative party aligned themselves against the 
project, the Finnish government and the majority of the EU member states supported 
it151. The official Finnish view of Nord Stream 2 project was given by the Finnish Prime 
Minister Juha Sipilä, who said that as the project does not provide any gas for Finland, 
and the Finnish government is not directly involved, Finland views the project only 
from an environmental perspective, and that the project had no security political 
implications152. The discussion on Nord Stream 2 arose again in Finland in 2018 when 
the Finnish government majority owned energy company Fortum purchased the German 
Uniper company that had invested over a billion euros in the Nord Stream 2 project153. 
This did not, however, change the opinion of the Finnish government that the project 
has nothing to do with the Finnish state, and that Fortum is in the project as a private 
corporation. After a lengthy process the Finnish Ministry of Economic affairs and 
Employment approved the construction of the pipeline in Finnish territorial waters in 
5.4.2018154 
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5 Germany  
5.1 Overview 
Germany is a middle European country and is the fourth largest country in Europe. It is 
bordered by Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France, 
Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany’s population has remained stable 
at around little over 80 million citizens since reunification. Berlin, the capital, is the 
largest city and had a population of around 3.5 million in 2016.155 Germany is one of 
the most influential EU member states and boasts the largest economy of all EU 
member states. Politically Germany has a strong say in almost all EU decisions and is a 
strong supporter of greenhouse gas reductions and renewable energy. The Energy Union 
is seen by Germany as mainly a tool to achieve an even stronger and more integrated 
internal energy market.156 
 
German energy policy has been dominated by the Energy Concept strategy, also known 
as Energiewende. It is a framework that aims to transform German energy sphere to a 
one based around renewable energy by 2050. In 2010 the original plan was to phase out 
fossil fuel-based power plants and substitute them by expanding the lifetime of the 
country’s nuclear power stations by around 12 years. The Fukushima nuclear accident 
in March 2011, however, changed the attitude of the German public and officials to 
have a far more negative view on nuclear energy. The German government decided that 
all nuclear power plants would be brought down by 2022157. 
 
Germany has been successful in reducing their greenhouse gas emission in the last two 
decades and has reached both the Kyoto targets and the EU targets of 2020. The 
Energiewende includes a further 40 % decrease in emissions by 2050.158 The key part of 
the Energiewende after 2011 has been natural gas, and Germany has multiple pipelines 
planned that will allow Germany to buy Russian gas directly. Gas was seen as a safer 
option than nuclear power, and cleaner than coal. The choice to increase the use of gas 
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was also understood to be rational, as wind and solar power were not enough to reach 
the greenhouse reduction goals of 2020 and keep the country’s industry competitive.159 
 
Energy efficiency is extremely important for Germany, and the industrial and building 
sectors are the key sectors in which efficiency is promoted. The Energiewende has 
placed 10 billion EUR to be used as efficiency incentives for the industrial sector. The 
German government also has initiatives that promote renewable energy-based heating 
and energy efficiency for the building sector.160 
 
Germany has a very complex and inflexible energy policy decision making and 
implementation system. Multiple ministries and state-owned companies have control on 
their respected areas of energy policy so the federal government cannot direct the 
country’s energy policy as effectively as others. Germany does not have a single 
department responsible for energy policy, but rather it is a complex collaborative effort 
that includes the federal government and the German states (Länder). Energy policy 
legislation is done by the government, but the Länder are responsible for the 
implementation of the national law. The Länder also shape energy management and 
state committees. National energy policy decisions are mainly the responsibility of the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Technologie or BMWi). They are also responsible for maintaining security of supply 
and monitoring gas, oil and electricity supply. Renewable energy development and 
adoption is controlled by the Federal ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, NatuRSCThutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit). Their main task is to monitor the environmental impact of the 
energy sector. The German energy policy is also affected and guided by private energy 
corporations, of which many are partly owned by the German state.161 
 
5.2 Statistics 
Germany in 2011 had a total TPES of 311.8 million tons of oil equivalent. 32.7% of the 
TPES came from oil, 24.8% from coal, 22.3% from natural gas, 11.3% from renewables 
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and 9 % from nuclear power. 162 In 2016 Germany’s total TPES was 311.5 Mtoe. 32% 
of the country’s TPES came from oil, 24% from coal, 23% from natural gas, 14% from 
renewables and 7% came from nuclear power.163 
 
Germany is the third highest energy user by TPES of all IEA members, only behind the 
USA and Japan. Germany has the largest energy supply of all EU member states, but 
they have been reducing their TPES ever since reunification, and in 2011 the goal was 
set to lower the TPES of the country to 216.7 Mtoe by 2030. 164 
 
Oil is the main energy source in use in Germany, but its use has been in decline for over 
a decade. Germany is connected to the oil fields of Russia by the Druzhba pipeline, 
running through Ukraine and Poland. The oil market in Germany is highly liberalized 
and has many competing market forces.165 Although oil is forecast by the government to 
be reduced in importance by 2030, it will still encompass 28.2 % of TPES. 166 
 
Coal is the second largest energy source in use in Germany. Hard coal and lignite are 
the only major domestic sources of energy in Germany, and in 2011 Germany was the 
largest producer of lignite in the world. The use of coal has stayed stable for some time 
and is expected to do so as the nuclear power fleet of the country is brought down. The 
main user of coal is the power sector which consumed over 90% of all lignite. The 
Government has, however, promised to end subsidies on hard coal by 2018. Lignite is 
expected to stay as a major energy source in Germany because of its low cost, energy 
security and ample supply.167  
 
Natural gas is the third largest energy source in Germany, but one that holds the biggest 
political, environmental and economic questions. Germany is at the heart of the natural 
gas market in Europe, with pipelines ending and beginning in Germany. Natural gas is 
expected to become one of Germany’s most important energy sources by 2030, when 
natural gas and LNG is expected to encompass 25% of TPES. Natural gas is the key 
energy source in the Energiewende especially after the decision to shut down all of the 
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country’s nuclear power plants. The environmental impact of natural gas use is 
politically charged in Germany, but it is also much cheaper and more energy efficient 
than renewable energy. Nearly all of the natural gas in Germany is imported, and 
Germany is Europe’s largest natural gas importer. Natural gas is imported into the 
country mainly from 3 countries Russia (38%), Norway (22%), and the Netherlands 
(26%).168 
 
Renewable energy is planned to become Germany’s main energy source by 2030, if the 
government can continue their plans laid out in the Energiewende. The Energiewende 
sees renewables creating 33.2% of TPES by 2030, with biofuels, wind, solar, 
geothermal and hydro power being the planned methods. In 2011 biofuels and waste 
was the largest source of renewable energy in Germany, creating 8.5% of TPES. The 
rise of renewable energy in Germany has been substantial, with 2.3% of energy coming 
from renewables in 2000, to 11.3 % in 2011. The government plans to expand the 
country’s wind and solar energy facilities further, as they only created around 1 % of 
TPES in 2011.169 
 
In 2011 Nuclear energy created 9% of the TPES, with a decrease of 4.1% since 2000. 
The government plans to completely phase down all nuclear reactors by 2022170, and in 
2012 Germany had shut down 8 nuclear power plants, with 9 still operational. 171 
 
Germany has no domestic oil deposits, and in 2015 no commercial use of natural gas 
deposits. Because of their energy heavy industry Germany is highly dependent on 
imported fossil fuels. The country does have a very well developed and interconnected 
oil and gas infrastructure system that’s connected to most central and eastern European 
energy markets. Germany also holds a 90-day oil reserve which surpasses the IEA 
requirements for security of supply. Germany also has the largest natural gas storage 
facilities in all of Europe and has plans to build LNG terminals in the future.172 
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Germany imported 75.1 Mtoe of natural gas in 2011, and even with the world’s largest 
coal production Germany still imported 32.7 Mtoe of coal in 2011173. Oil is the single 
largest import with 96.9 million tons of oil imported in 2011174. In 2016 Germany 
imported 91.2 million tons of oil, of which 39.5 % came from the Russian Federation. 
They imported 91.53 Mtoe of gas and 46.6% of it came from Russia. 53.6 million 
tonnes of coal was also imported of which 30.3% came from Russia.175 
 
The largest consumer of energy in Germany in 2011 was the industrial sector, 
consuming 35.6% of the country’s energy sources. Residential sector is the second 
largest consumer with 25.4% consumption, with the transport sector coming third with 
24.5%. The German government plans to lower the total level of energy consumption as 
a part of the Energiewende.176 
 
5.3 German energy policy before the Ukraine crisis 
September 2010 saw the German government embark on an ambitious new energy 
policy initiative to reduce the country’s energy consumption and reduce greenhouse 
emission by 80 to 95% by 2015. This Energiewende, as it is better known, set Germany 
on course for a fundamental and bold overhaul of the entire energy system of the 
country. By 2050 Germany plans to have an environmentally sustainable, reliable and 
affordable energy system which would be achieved through long-term and integrated 
strategy. The 2010 Energiewende is built on the integrated energy and climate 
programme of 2007. The goals of the original energy and climate programme are still 
the same, but the Energy Concepts main objective is to ensure a climate-compatible, 
reliable and affordable energy supply for Germany. The Energy Concept is seen to work 
together with the EU targets of greenhouse gas reduction, expanding renewable energies 
and increasing energy efficiency.177 
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In 2011 the most pressing concern for the German government was the Euro-crisis 
which was feared to affect German economy and hamper the development of renewable 
energy.178 
 
The Energiewiende was widely popular but the price of the project was questioned in 
public debate. Renewable energy is not suitable everywhere, and some German Länder 
were concerned that the price of energy might rise and hurt German industry. Most 
Länder do not have interwoven energy systems and infrastructure, so a federal approach 
first needed substantial and costly infrastructure efforts to update and build new energy 
infrastructure (especially in the east).179 The government planned to make sure that the 
benefits of the Energiewende would be equally divided, even to those states that did not 
produce energy.180 The Energiewende sees energy efficiency as the main way to achieve 
the ambitious reduction in the primary energy consumption down by 50% by 2050 
(compared to 2008). Renewable energy was hailed as the future of energy in Germany, 
but the country’s energy base was still strongly built upon fossil fuels, mainly oil, gas 
and coal. Unlike the integrated energy and climate programme, the Energy Concept had 
a planned roadmap that allowed the government to implement the needed changes. The 
Energy Concept has a multilayered approach to it and tries to include all affected parties 
to the decisions, and tries to offer environmentally friendly approaches to energy, but at 
the same time ones that are economically sound, so that growth and competition aren’t 
affected. It has multiple energy policy goals such as securing the security of supply, 
combat against climate change and allow German industry to grow and stay 
competitive. The German government believed that the Energy Concept would make 
Germany a leading power in energy efficiency, environmental protection and 
competitive energy prices, and still maintain a high standard of living.181 
 
The original Energy Concept of 2010 was, however, amended in 2011, after the March 
2011 Fukushuma Daiichi nuclear accident. Originally nuclear power was a key 
component of the Energiewende, as the energy created from nuclear power was both 
affordable and greenhouse emission free. The events of March 2011, however, changed 
the public and political opinion against nuclear power, and it was decided that nuclear 
power would be completely phased out in Germany by the end of 2022. This decision 
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came into force on the 6th of August 2011 when the Bundestag (parliament) passed the 
13th act amending the Atomic energy act. The new amendment was supported by the 
German reactor safety commission and the Ethics commission, as they saw that 
although extremely unlikely, a nuclear accident would be devastating to the German 
nation. It, however, became extremely clear that a radical reorganization of the 
country’s energy supply would be needed, as nuclear energy was a vital part of 
Germany’s energy supply. The Energy package of 2011 was needed to accelerate the 
efforts laid out in the original Energy Concept which outlined the expansion of 
renewables, grid expansion, further energy efficiency and funding for the new 
reforms.182 
 
The phasing out of the nuclear reactors was a major challenge for the Energy Concept, 
as nuclear power provided 22.6% of the electricity used in Germany in 2010183. This 
new development was seen by some as a risk to German and European energy security, 
as even though the Energiewende aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
diversify energy sources, it has not allowed Germany to secure low carbon energy 
sources. The country was expected to become far more dependent on imported fossil 
fuels, especially Russian gas and oil, as the federal government had plans to stop all 
hard coal mining in Germany by 2018 and stop all subsidies on lignite.184 
 
In 2013 Germany had the largest per capita carbon footprint of the EU, and the order in 
which the power sources were phased out caused controversy. According to John Rhys 
taking nuclear power offline before coal, was considered a policy failure, and was 
linked with the German government’s risk assessment after effects of the Fukushima 
disaster.  The original plan of cutting emissions was overshadowed by the immediate 
impact in public opinion after the events of March 2011 and by 2012 8 of the country’s 
17 nuclear plants had been shut down.185 
 
Russian energy was seen as a reliable energy provider in 2012, and there was little to no 
concern of threats to the security of supply186. The German government continued to see 
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energy as a commodity, and not as a strategic resource187 . The events of 2006 in 
Georgia and 2009 in Ukraine caused condemnation in Germany, but it did not radically 
alter the federal government’s view of Russia being a reliable trading partner 188 . 
Because energy is understood as an economic and commercial commodity Germany is 
strongly against any involvement of NATO or other international actors in energy 
relations.189 Energy experts in Germany have a view that energy security is mainly a 
civilian matter. Energy issues are to be decided by the markets and are not to be 
militarized which they argue only weakens the energy security of Germany.190  
 
Historically Germany has seen Russia, and Russian energy, as trustworthy and that the 
German-Russian relationship is a special relationship. During the Cold War West-
Germany was at the forefront of the conflict and they successfully eased tensions 
between the USSR and the West. This diplomatic attitude can be seen today in German 
relations to the USSR’s successor state the Russian Federation. Trade is an important 
part of the German appeasement approach, and it is used to create mutual 
interdependence which Germany hopes will keep tensions to a minimum. This mix of 
trade and civilian power has been often dubbed “Ostpolitik” which has dominated 
German relationship with most eastern European countries. The core idea behind 
Ostpolitik has been the idea of change through interdependence (Wandel durch 
Verflechtung)191 . Germany has often been unwilling to exert force in their foreign 
policy and has rather used trade as a tool to create interdependencies. This is one of the 
reasons why Germany became a champion of integration in the EU, but also why they 
have maintained Russian reliability as a trading partner. The special relationship with 
Russia is also seen as a part of the German security policy, as Germany can work as a 
mediator between NATO and Russia.192  
 
EU attempts to create stronger inner markets for energy were at odds with Germany’s 
way of doing energy trade and policy without consulting other member states or the EU. 
In the EU Germany did support climate and environmental policy initiatives, and the 
environmental policy aspect of energy was one of the only fields of external energy 
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policy that Germany did not leave to the economic sphere.193 German energy policy is 
interlinked with EU climate policy through the integrated energy and climate 
programme of August 2007. The programme was launched at the march 2007 European 
council of heads of state and government meeting that outlined an integrated European 
climate and energy policy. The meeting was done under the German presidency of the 
European council of heads of state and government, and outlined a strict policy of 
energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions and the development of renewable energy. 
The guiding principles of the programme were the security of supply, economic 
efficiency and environmental protection.194  
 
The most important energy project between Germany and Russia, and one that holds the 
most political ramifications for German relations to other eastern European countries, is 
the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline project which saw its second line becoming 
operational at the end of 2012. Starting from Vyborg Russia and ending at Greifswald in 
Germany, the original 1222-kilometer sub-sea pipeline was laid out in 4 May 2011, and 
it became operational in 8th of November 2011. 195  The project is the result of 
cooperation between 5 energy companies, the Russian state-owned Gazprom, the 
German Uniper and Wintershall, the Dutch Gasunie and the French Engie company. 
Since 2012 the pipeline has a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The 
Nord stream pipeline is operated under the special purpose company Nord Stream AG, 
with majority of it being owned by the Russian government owned company Gazprom 
(51 %).196 The planning for an expansion to the Nord stream pipeline, dubbed Nord 
Stream 2, began in 2011. The plan was to double the capacity of the original project to 
110 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and Nord Stream AG planned to build the 
extension through the territorial waters of Estonia or Finland. 197  The Nord stream 
project has been strongly opposed by many Baltic and Eastern European countries, 
mainly transit states of Poland and Ukraine for its energy security issues, but also by 
Sweden for the possible environmental concerns that the project might cause198. The 
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critics of the project had since the beginning seen the project as nothing more than 
Russian geoeconomics that aim to bypass Ukraine and Poland to undermine their 
positions as transit states199. 
 
5.4 German energy policy after the Ukraine crisis 
The Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation in Crimea caused major 
condemnation from the German government and media. Chancellor Angela Merkel 
made strong statements condemning Russia’s actions which were seen in other EU 
states as a sign that Germany was willing to assume leadership in the EU push against 
Russia. Germany, however, had their own face on the line. Russian aggression in 
Ukraine and their disregard of national borders was a sign that Russia had not been 
changed through trade towards a more democratic and peaceful nation, and that the 
special relationship that Germany and Russia had was, if not broken, on hold.200 Merkel 
shocked some in Germany when she called for economic sanctions against Russia and 
asked both Germany and the EU to rethink their relationship with Russia. She did hope 
that the crisis could be averted through diplomacy rather than escalation.201  
 
Germany took the leadership in the Ukraine crisis mainly because of their special 
relationship but also because they are seen as not very self-interested and are far more 
democratic than other great powers. 202  At the Munich Conference of 2014 Angela 
Merkel showed a far more active form of German foreign policy towards Russia, that 
did not rule out the possibility of military action203. Germany was still against any EU 
accession talks with Ukraine, as Angela Merkel’s government feared that it might hurt 
the German-Russian relationship even further. The German government did, however, 
support the association agreement with Ukraine.204 Merkel and Putin were speaking 
daily during the beginning phases of the Ukraine crisis. The downing of MH17 in July 
of 2014 was the event that ended the hopes of the German government that the crisis 
might be averted early through diplomacy.205 Before the downing of the MH17 flight it 
was very uncommon to hear anti-Russian views on German media, and during the 
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opening phases of the Ukraine crisis Russian quests were twice as common on German 
news as Ukrainians.206 
 
The German public were not as worried of Russia as many German politicians during 
the beginning phases of the conflict. A TNS survey made in March 2014 showed that 
54% of German supported the annexation of Crimea, and 55% showed understanding 
for the Russian view that Ukraine and Crimea are part of the Russian zone of influence. 
What showed a divide between the German public, however, was that 60% of Germans 
saw the reactions of the West as appropriate, and the support for the sanctions rose from 
54% to 65% after the downing of the MH17 flight.207 
 
The German industry began to lobby against possible sanctions against Russia almost 
immediately after the crisis, especially sanctions against oil and gas imports208. The 
representatives of the German industrial and commercial interests in Eastern Europe and 
Russia, The Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, saw that the damage done to 
Russian relations would be substantial, and saw no reduction to the animosity before the 
Minsk-2 peace agreement would be realized. The Ost-Ausschuss saw that the sanctions 
policy was to blame for the deteriorating trust between Russia and the West.209 
 
There were also many prominent German political figures who were strongly against 
any sanctions against Russia. The former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder and 
Helmut Kohl and former Prime Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were strongly against 
the sanctions and wanted Germany to continue dialogue, trade and diplomacy with 
Russia 210 . The Social democrat leader Frank-Walter Steinmeier also expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the sanctions, but after the annexation of Crimea he did show some 
criticism towards Russian211.  
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When it came time to formulate the sanctions against Russia, Germany was adamant 
that the Russian energy sector must be lefts outside the EU sanctions212. Russian oil and 
gas were seen as far too important for Germany, especially with the Energiewende still 
under way and German nuclear power plants being brought down. Germany, together 
with other anti-energy sanction member states, successfully limited the EU sanctions to 
exclude Russian energy, much to the dissatisfaction of many eastern European states.213  
 
This reluctance to impose sanctions on Russian energy sector limited the effectiveness 
of the EU response. Germany was, however, in a position where it was too dependent 
on Russian energy to risk a possible energy crisis, even though Angela Merkel’s 
government did push for the EU sanctions against Russia. In 2013 the CDU/CSU/SPD 
coalition were aware of the dangers of becoming economically dependent on Russia, 
even though the coalition was unanimous on continuing partnership with Russia. This 
was seen as some as the end of the Wandel durch Verflechtung (change through 
interdependence) policy, as Russia had not changed to a more democratic and peaceful 
society, and the interdependence had in fact turned into a German dependence on 
Russian gas and oil. 214  Some did not, however, believe that the change through 
interdependence doctrine was dead, but that it might have become even more important 
after the crisis. In 2015 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German foreign minister at the 
time, proposed that the EU should offer investment and energy concessions to Russia, 
rather than to continue the EU-Ukraine trade negotiations. The idea is that relations with 
Ukraine are confrontational, whereas appeasing Russia through trade might lead to the 
end of hostilities in the long run.215  
 
The events after the annexation of Ukraine showed that Germany’s rhetoric of Russia 
did not extend to actions on energy related issues. Although Merkel has taken a 
seemingly strong position against Russia in the Ukraine crisis, she did support Nord 
Stream 2 project. The view remained that the project was not political, but a business 
decision made by corporations not under the EU sanctions216. This position was backed 
by the parliament (Bundestag) which reassured Germany’s that the project would not 
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lead to further German dependency on Russian gas, but it will in fact help in the 
diversification of Germany’s energy supply as according to the Energy Concept and the 
Energy Union.217  In 2015 the German energy companies E.ON and Wintershall, in 
cooperation with Royal Dutch Shell, French ENGIE and Austrian ÖMV relaunched the 
Nord Stream 2 project together with Gazprom.218  
 
The Nord stream 2 pipeline was still seen as a domestic, or an economic decision in 
Germany, and the main negative views that were expressed were the possible 
environmental impacts that the project might have, and the worries that the project 
might do considerable harm to Polish-German relations. The project has politically only 
been objected by the green party of Germany for worsening German relations with 
eastern European countries and worsening the dependency on Russian gas.  There has 
also been criticism of the price of the project, as land-based pipelines are already 
operational and far cheaper. The German media made some comments of the possibility 
that Russia might use their “energy weapon” against Germany 219 .The German 
government has dismissed these views and maintains their position that Gazprom is a 
reliable economic partner and being the only major corporation able to provide Russian 
gas into Europe they maintain a competitive edge that is impossible to rival.220  
 
Germany has since its unveiling in 2014 viewed the European Energy Union project 
through its own domestic energy policy projects. The Energiewende was still nowhere 
near completion, when the Polish Prime minister Donald Tusk introduced the concept of 
the Energy Union. Götz Reichert, the head of the energy division at the Centre for 
European policy said that Germany is facing multiple hurdles in their energy policy as it 
is. The phase out of nuclear power and the reforming of their power market all affect 
Germany’s views on the Energy Union. He sees that Germany, as all member states, are 
in constant struggle with the EU when it comes to energy policy. Germany wants to 
maintain their own energy policy agenda’s, whereas the EU wants more cooperation 
and convergence with other member states. Germany wants to maintain their own 
support system for renewable energy, and not go with the EU plan.221 In 2014 Germany 
had to change its support for renewables and bring out a bidding system, so that their 
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energy policy would follow the EU’s Environmental and energy state aid guidelines. 
Germany’s industrial association are supportive of the EU wide push for a common 
energy policy, especially the common energy market. Hildegard Müller, chairwoman of 
the German Association of Energy and Water Industries said that security of supply in 
the electricity market needs a common approach. The BMWi and the Commission have 
not been as supportive of the Energy Unions capacity markets and have seen them as 
the “last resort” to maintain energy security. Germany is supportive of the Energy 
Union’s idea of more gas and energy interconnections between member states, but the 
German government still maintains their position that collective gas purchases are a 
violation the rights of private energy suppliers.222 In the German governments non-
paper on the Energy Union Germany saw the internal EU energy market as the 
cornerstone of security of supply, and that joint gas purchases were against the 
liberalization of the gas markets. Together with the internal market the German 
government saw decarbonification and the reduction of energy demand as the key ways 




Poland is a central European country on the Baltic Sea and had a population of little 
under 38 million in 2015224 which made it the sixth largest member state in the EU by 
population. It borders Germany, the Czech and Slovak republics, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Lithuania and the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast exclave. Poland is also the ninth‐largest 
country in Europe.225 
 
The Polish government places energy security high on its agenda and the use of 
domestic energy sources (coal, gas, oil) is common in all sectors226. Ever since the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the end of Communism in 1990 Poland has placed long term 
energy security and self-sufficiency as key goals of the state. Poland has the fifth-lowest 
TPES per capita among IEA member countries. The largest single energy user is the 
                                                 
222 Appunn 2015 
223 German government 2015 
224 World Bank 
225 International energy agency 2016, 17 





industrial sector and Poland has one of the largest heating systems in Europe. Coal is 
the main source of energy in the residential sector. 227 
 
There is a divided view in Poland about the future of renewable energy. Some see it as 
the answer to the country’s energy security, whereas others see it a potential risk. 
Renewables in Poland are seen as direct competitor to coal which is seen as a reliable, 
cheap and in ample supply, whereas renewable energy is seen as expensive and 
unreliable. There is also a narrative in place where Poland is feared to become 
dependent on other EU member states if their switch to renewable energy, as the 
technology needed to maintain a high yield renewable energy system would have to 
come from foreign countries (especially Germany). Renewable energy also faces 
massive socio-economical problems when trying to reduce coal use. The coal industry is 
major employer in Poland, with over a 100 000 people being employed in coal mining 
and energy, and there would also be enormous costs to update the current energy 
transmission infrastructure.228 Coal mining is also a very respected industry in Poland, 
with coal miners seen as more respected than doctors or professors in a 2016 survey229. 
Poland has tried to diversify and develop their domestic energy sources by investing in 
liquefied gas terminals and funding green coal technology.230 
 
Since 2011 Poland has aimed to develop its domestic natural gas production. The 
achievements so far are the unbundling of the natural gas sector, the establishment of an 
independent system operator and bringing liquefied natural gas to the market. The new 
Świnoujście liquefied natural gas terminal is a step towards supply diversification, and 
in total encompasses a quarter of the country’s natural gas demand.231 Poland is also 
looking to exploit new shale gas deposits and has plans to build a Baltic gas pipeline 
which would allow Poland to connect with the Norwegian natural gas network. The 
project is planned to be ready by 2022.232 
 
The Polish energy policy is firmly under governmental control, but powerful coal, oil 
and gas companies can have a say in energy policy and they lobby strongly for the use 
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of domestic fossil fuels. To combat the possible influence of corporations Poland 
created the Ministry of Energy in 2015 to coordinate energy policy decision making, 
and make sure that energy security is not compromised by economic or environmental 
issues. Before the creation of the Ministry of Energy in 2015 the Polish energy policy 
was coordinated by the Ministry of Economy, in coordination with other ministries. The 
Ministry of Energy was created after the Ukraine crisis and it sets out the legal 
framework for energy policy. It’s tasks include the development and implementation of 
energy policy and security. The Ministry of Energy is also the asset owner of 
government owned energy companies and includes them in decision making. The 
Ministry of Environment is responsible for monitoring the carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the energy secrot, and the approval of licenses for 
exploration and extraction of raw materials. 233 Poland also unveiled a new energy law 
in 2013234. The new law was implemented to adjust the energy sector to EU regulations 
on greenhouse emissions, but also to safeguard against threats to energy security which 
the Polish President of the Energy Regulatory Office describes as the “long-term 
imbalance on the fuel and energy market”235. 
 
EU directives and requirements are a key part of Poland’s energy policy decisions, even 
though the Polish government does not always agree with the EU’s energy and climate 
goals, but the country has ratified both the Kyoto protocol and the Paris climate 
agreement236. The EU is especially interested in forcing Poland to liberalize its gas and 
electricity markets and reach the EU greenhouse emission reduction goals. 237 
 
6.2 Statistics 
In 2011 Poland’s TPES was 101 Mtoe of which 56% came from coal, 25% from oil, 
13% from natural gas and 6% from biomass 238.  In 2015 Poland’s total TPES was 94.6 
Mtoe, of which 50.8% came from coal, 24.5% from oil, 14.6% from natural gas and 
biofuels and waste creating 8.9%. Other renewables such as wind and hydro power 
created just 1.2 % of TPES. 239 
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Currently Poland has no nuclear energy production, but there are plans to build reactors 
in the future. The government sees nuclear energy as a way to secure domestic energy 
and increase energy security. Nuclear energy would also help Poland reach its EU 
carbon emission reduction goals. The Polish nuclear power program which was 
approved in 2014, includes 2 nuclear power plants (6 000-megawatt and a 3 000-
megawatt power plant) to be commissioned in 2022. If constructed these new plants 
would create 8% of Poland’s energy needs.240 
 
The use of hard coal and lignite are the foundation of the Poland’s energy system and 
Poland’s energy strategy, as they are both available domestically in large quantities. In 
2015, coal provided over 50% TPES of Poland which is the second highest amount of 
all OECD countries.241 
 
In 2015 oil was the second-largest energy source in Poland, with 24% of the country’s 
TPES. Poland has some domestic oil production but almost all crude oil comes from 
other countries. The Russian Federation provides most of Poland’s oil from the Druzhba 
pipeline and the Naftoport oil terminal in Gdańsk. Poland aims to build new pipelines to 
diversify its oil imports. New pipeline connections are a crucial part of Poland’s future 
energy security.242 
 
In the past few years Poland has had some progress in the development of renewable 
energy and its share in TPES increased from 5% in 2004 to 10.4% in 2014. Even though 
there has been some progress, renewable energy is facing pressure from political actors, 
as the threat of Russian energy dependency creates pressure to expand and update the 
country’s aging coal power plants. The new Renewable Energy Act adopted in 2015, 
created a new an auction based regulatory process which the Polish government hopes 
will speed up the development of renewable energy.243 
 
Poland is the region’s second largest importer of energy after Germany, and in 2015 
only coal production was enough to fill domestic demand. All of the country’s oil and 
66% of natural gas was imported, almost exclusively from Russia. In 2012, however, 
Poland was the least energy dependent EU member state, as it imported 25.8% of its 
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energy sources (EU average 53%).244 Of the imports 96% of oil came from the Russian 
Federation in 2012245. In 2016 Poland imported 24.8 million tons of oil of which 83.7% 
came from Russia. Poland also imported 13.23 Mtoe of gas of which 74.3% came from 
Russia, and 8.6 million tons of coal of which 60.6% came from Russia. 246 
 
6.3 Polish energy policy before the Ukraine crisis 
Polish energy policy in 2011 to 2014 was mainly governed by ministry of economy, but 
it was in many aspects a collaboration of multiple ministries such as the Ministry of 
Environment and the Ministry of State Treasury. The most important goals and aspects 
of Polish energy policy were outlined in the document “the Energy Policy of Poland 
until 2030”, or for short EPP247. The goals of EPP were: improved energy efficiency, 
the security of fuel and energy supplies, the diversification of electricity generation by 
nuclear power, development of renewable energy sources (mainly biofuels), 
strengthening of fuel and energy markets and the reduction of environmental impact of 
the energy sector248.  
 
Energy security was a key concern of the Polish government and was the main driving 
force behind all energy policy decisions249. Energy in Poland is often the matter of 
security policy. Energy dependency to Russia is a common political topic and all 
diversification and development of energy sources and infrastructure were important 
aspects of reaching energy security.250  
 
In 2013 there were plans to build 2 nuclear power plants and a network of gas terminals 
(Both natural gas and LNG) and energy transit connections to neighboring countries, 
especially between Germany, the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic. There was 
also plans to build a possible North-South Gas corridor that would have connected the 
LNG terminals in Croatia with those of Central Europe. This expansion was a part of 
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the Gaz-System plan which aimed to diversify Poland’s natural gas imports so that the 
dependency on Russian gas would be broken completely251.  
 
Poland has been a difficult EU member state when making climate and energy 
regulation in the European Union. The country did not endorse the EU energy roadmap 
of 2050, and has strongly advocated against strong decarbonization goals, but 
internationally the country does take part in the fight against climate change252. Poland 
was able to reach the 2020 goals of 20% reduction in greenhouse emissions, but this 
was only achieved by implementing wide ranging changes to the country’s industry, and 
these changes caused fears in Poland that security of supply might be at risk253. Being 
the tenth largest emitter of greenhouse gasses of all the OECD countries, Poland has 
found it difficult to fulfill its EU climate goals, as the costs to the Polish domestic coal 
and oil production hurt the overall economy.254 
 
Poland outlined their national climate strategy in the National Strategy for Adaptation to 
Climate Change (NAS 2020). The framework was published in October of 2013 and it 
was meant to prepare the country for sweeping changes in energy production necessary 
for reducing greenhouse emission, without harming the socio-economic development. 
Climate change was seen as a major risk for the Polish nation, and the NAS 2020 saw 
the positive impacts that the reforms would have on the Polish environment and 
economic growth255.  
 
6.4 Polish energy policy after the Ukraine crisis 
After the Ukraine crisis and the occupation of Crimea the Polish government and 
general public voiced full support of Ukraine and condemned Russian hostilities. 
Ukraine has been an important neighbor for Poland, and the Russian energy dependency 
threat has been a shared topic between the countries. The events that unfolded in the 
Donbas and Crimea were a sign for Poland that their fears of Russia were proven 
correct, and that energy dependency to Russia must end.256 
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The Ukraine crisis caused a major energy policy review in Poland, and in 2014 the 
Polish ministry of economy gave the country 3 options for the future: 1) A balanced mix 
of all energy resources, 2) one based on nuclear energy and 3) one based on shale gas, 
LNG and renewable energy257. When the Law and Justice party came to power in 2015 
they immediately said that they would not continue the gas contract with Gazprom in 
2022 and would instead look to rid Poland of Russian gas imports258.  
 
The Ukraine crisis created strong rifts between the EU and Poland, as EU’s actions were 
seen as too weak and divided in Poland. Ukraine became a part of Polish internal policy 
as the fears rose that the same events that happened in Ukraine could happen in Poland. 
The crisis allowed Poland to drive towards stronger securitization of key policy areas 
both domestically and in the EU, especially energy.259 In the wider EU context Poland 
became far more assertive in energy security. Being the symbolic leader of the Visegrad 
group Poland began to support its own policy in the EU. In 2014 Poland was able to 
postpone the EU climate and energy goals of 2030, as the strong greenhouse emission 
reduction targets were in Poland’s view far too dangerous for the country’s coal, gas 
and oil-based energy production and industry, and would worsen their dependency on 
Russian fossil fuels. Together with the other Visegrad countries Poland was able to 
negotiate better terms in October of 2014.260 
 
Although the first steps towards a common European energy policy date back to 2010, 
when the European energy community was proposed by the President of the European 
Parliament Jerzy Buzek and the former head of the European Commission Jacques 
Delors, it was Poland which had pushed for and had the greatest influence on the 
Energy Union. In 2014 the then Polish Prime minister Donald Tusk was a key advocate 
for a unified EU energy policy, and the Polish government wanted a common EU 
energy policy based around energy security in response to the Ukraine crisis and the 
ever-worsening European dependency on Russian fossil fuels. 261 
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The Energy union project was in the beginning know as a ‘Polish idea’ and the main 
debate was centered around joint gas purchases262. The Energy Union project received 
wide support from the EU member states as it placed security of supply high on the 
agenda. The project was also seen as an alternative to EU climate and energy policies 
which are centered around environmental and economic policy rather than security.263 
Poland wanted to push for a more securitized understanding of energy policy, as they 
had domestically, to confront the Russia’s hostile actions towards Ukraine264.  
 
The original proposal that Poland had for the European energy union had six elements: 
1). An effective solidarity mechanism that would be used in case of gas supply crisis; 
2). Stronger EU funding of energy infrastructure, especially in the eastern EU. EU 
would fund up to 75 % of these projects. 3). Joint gas and oil purchases; 4). 
Rehabilitation of coal as a source of energy; 5). Shale gas extraction; 6). Complete 
diversification of gas supplies to the EU. 265  These original points made by Poland 
marginalized environmental factors, and strongly echoed Poland’s own energy security 
interests. Poland had wanted to update their energy infrastructure and harness domestic 
energy sources for decades but had been stopped by the lack of funds and EU 
regulations on fossil fuels.266  
 
When the Energy Union project reached the EU commission the Polish six points were 
shaped into 5 pillars: 1). Security of supplies based on the principles of solidarity and 
trust; 2). Competitive and completed internal energy market; 3). Reduction of the 
energy demand; 4). Decarbonization of the EU’s energy mix; 5). Research and 
development of renewable energy. 267 The commission removed the rehabilitation of 
hydrocarbons and the joint energy purchases parts and replaced them with 
decarbonization and reductions in energy demand. This was a major blow to Poland’s 
original vision on the Energy Union which would have secured their domestic energy 
supply and allowed the EU to use their joint purchasing power to counter Russian 
energy domination. These setbacks enforced Polish views that EU climate policy 
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actions (especially decarbonization) are as big of a problem as energy dependency, or 
that EU’s climate policy is what has causes and maintains the dependency268. Poland 
especially views Germany’s Energy Concept as not only as a domestic energy security 
threat, but as a threat to the entire EU269. Even though the Energy Union was changed 
considerably in the Commission, Poland was still strongly behind the project, as it did 
open EU level discussions on energy security. The then Polish Prime Minister Beata 
Szydło was able to revise the security of supply aspect of the Energy Union so that 
member states were required to hold stocks of hydrocarbons and have a solidarity 
mechanism in the event of a crisis270.  
 
Energy continued to be the most pressing policy agenda of the Polish government after 
the Ukraine crisis, and to simplify and enhance the country’s energy policy decision 
making they created the new Ministry of Energy in 2015. The ministry was the result of 
years of negotiations and continues the efforts to diversify the country’s energy 
production, enhance energy security and energy efficiency. The main legal framework 
for the new ministry were the EU directives and requirements, and the main goal was 
the reduction of the country’s dependency of Russian energy. The energy ministry’s 
policy in 2015 was the development of alternative fuel sources, the updating of 
infrastructure and the utilization of domestic energy sources.271 
 
The single most important project for Polish energy security was the 2015 Nord Stream 
2 project which caused a major political and public resistance in Poland. The Polish 
government maintains their view that the project is a Russian geoeconomical tool to 
strengthen their energy dominance in Europe and divert natural gas flow so that it 
bypasses both Poland and Ukraine. Poland, together with other Visegrad group 
countries, view the project as a direct threat to energy security. The project is seen with 
hostility, and together with energy security threats the project is deemed 
environmentally and economically harmful for Europe, and as a “’weapon’ of hybrid 
warfare”.272  Poland also fears that the project would harm the country’s ability to 
diversify and update their energy sources and infrastructure. The Polish government 
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argues that if they are not able to control the flow of gas to the EU, the new LNG 
terminal in Świnoujście could not compete against cheap Russian natural gas273. The 
former Polish Prime minister and president of the European council Donald Tusk 
addressed these concerns in his letter to the president of the European Commission 
Jean-Claude Juncker. He called the project a threat to both European security and 
climate policy and urged the European council and commission to halt the project. He 
also stressed that the Nord Stream 2 would be against the goal of reducing energy 
dependency set out in the Energy Union and would also harm Ukraine’s and Eastern EU 
member states status’s as transit countries274. 
 
7 Analysis 
I will now analyze the energy policy development of the chosen member states to see 
how the crisis affected their energy policy development, what are the key energy 
security concerns and vital energy systems, and if the Energy Union can be considered a 
sign of an EU RSC. I will start by examining every state individually and then move to 
the comparative analysis. 
 
7.1 Finland  
After the Ukraine crisis Finland saw a rise in the amount of renewable energy from 
26.5% to 32% and nuclear power use also rose slightly. The use of fossil fuels dropped, 
with natural gas being the biggest drop from 9,7% to 6%.  Finland also lowered their 
imports from 77.8% of total TPES in 2011, to 45.33% TPES in 2016. The Finnish 
government aimed to reduce the amount of fossil fuels even more by expanding nuclear 
power and renewable energy in the near future.  
 
The Finnish energy base is very dispersed, with oil, nuclear power, coal, renewable 
energy sources and peat all a major part of the energy base. This diversification creates 
the backbone of the Finnish energy security as the Finnish government could reduce 
energy imports and production in one sector by increasing another. 
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Before the Ukraine crisis Finland viewed Russian energy as a possible risk. The energy 
dependency to Russia was a continuous pressure point which the Finnish government 
aimed to reduce via domestic renewable energy sources and by developing further 
nuclear power stations and energy connections. Energy security was a concern in 
Finland prior to the crisis as the reliance on imported energy in the EU was more than 
half in 2012. Russian dominance in the crude oil, coal and natural gas markets were 
taken seriously, and Finland advocated for a common European energy policy that 
would consider the internal markets, as well as the issues of environment and 
sustainable development. At the time the Finnish government also looked to strengthen 
the Nordic energy market and linking Finland with the Baltic gas market.  
 
The Finnish reactions to the Ukraine crisis were universally condemning towards 
Russia, but it's effects on energy policy were not immediate and substantial. Official and 
public debate about the subject was divisive, with fears of Russian energy domination 
alarming many media outlets and Finnish government officials, but the topic soon 
disappeared from both public and political discourse. Finland is in a difficult situation 
when it comes to Russian energy, and although Russian energy dependency was seen as 
a considerable risk by nearly all sectors of the society, the state believed that Finland 
can handle the situation via diversification, and only oil and gas were singled out as 
possible risks. The media and the public image turned against Russian energy 
purchases, but climate change was still seen as the most important aspect when 
formulating domestic energy strategy. The expansion of renewable energy sources was 
a way to tackle both climate change and energy dependency. Finland hoped that with 
the development of the Energy Union, and by reaching the necessary EU greenhouse 
gas reduction goals, Russian energy dependency could be reduced. Finland, however, 
does not want to completely sever its energy ties with Russia, as there is an almost 
common perception that keeping good relations with Russia also needs bilateral projects 
and trade.  
 
The Finnish government created a separation between diplomatic and economic 
relations with Russia after the Ukraine crisis, as was shown by the actions of President 
Sauli Niinistö and also by Prime ministers Stubb and Sipilä. Russia was deemed a 
military threat and a political enemy of the EU, but officials in Finland still maintained 
the position that Russia is a reliable trading partner regardless of their action. Tuomas 





consensus that trade with Russia must continue regardless of the threat, and as Finland's 
third biggest export partner, and main energy importer, Russia had an unrivaled position 
in Finnish trade policy. The EU sanctions on Russia were, however, supported by 
Finland, and as a result of the Russian military activity in the Baltic region, Finland 
boosted their military budget and strengthened their defense cooperation with Sweden 
and NATO. Finland also continued their strong support for a common EU defense and 
security policy.275 The EU sanctions caused major fears in Finnish political and business 
circles, as Finland was economically far more dependent on Russia, than Russia was of 
Finland276. Finland, however, supported the EU sanctions in practice and in word, but at 
the same time continued to support eastern trade and tried to continue bilateral 
diplomatic relations with Russia.277 
 
Unlike fossil fuels, Finland does not view nuclear energy of having immediate or long-
lasting threat to energy security, as the security of supply of nuclear energy is far better 
than for gas or oil which can be cut immediately. The Fennovoima nuclear power plant 
project had a strong backing of the Finnish government from the beginning, with the 
only exception being the Green League party. Nuclear energy facilities are considered 
vital energy systems for Finland as the facilities are located on Finnish soil and are thus 
immune to energy cuts. Finland also views energy trade with Russia from much the 
same way as Germany; as a diplomatic tool. The decision to continue the Fennovoima 
project with Rosatom was shown to have a huge significance for the Finnish 
government as the partly state-owned energy company Fortum was needed to make sure 
the project would succeed. Rehns comments also show that there has been political 
pressure to make sure that the project will reach the necessary 60 % EU ownership 
criteria, as his sudden change of heart gives clear insight to the massive importance the 
Fennovoima project has for the Finnish government.  The 60 % EU ownership criteria 
also coincides with Corry’s riskification, as the Finnish governments safety margin was 
not meant to stop the project but to minimize the possible risks and also legitimize the 
project. Although the use of energy as an extension of diplomacy with Russia mirrors 
that of Germany’s, Finnish academics, politicians and media are far more cautious than 
those in Germany, and there is a consensus that Russia is not as reliable of a trading 
partner as the top-level Finnish politicians say. 
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When the Energy Union project came forth Finland supported the project as a way to 
secure the security of supply and help Finland connect with the EU energy market. 
Diversification of energy supplies is key to Finnish energy security, so as Finland aimed 
to reduce Russian fossil fuels, they needed alternative connections to gas and oil in 
order to maintain a high level of diversification of energy sources. The Balticconnector 
gas pipeline project shows that Finland doesn’t view gas in general as a risk, but they do 
view Russian gas as a risk.  
 
7.2 Germany 
Germany has a huge energy base, with a TPES of 311.8 Mtoe in 2011, and 311.5 Mtoe 
in 2016. The amount did reduce slightly after the Ukraine crisis, but the level of 
decrease is nowhere near the necessary level envisioned in the Energiewende. 
Germany’s import dependency rose considerably after the Ukraine crisis, and the 
phasing down of most of the country’s nuclear power plants has seen the amount of 
imported gas has risen from 75.1 Mtoe in 2011 to 91.53 Mtoe in 2016. The amount of 
coal imported also rose from 32.7 MToe in 2011 to 53.6 Mtoe in 2016. The amount of 
oil imported dropped slightly from 96.9 Million tons in 2011 to 91.2 million tons in 
2016. Germany has a plan to reduce the total TPES to 216.7 Mtoe by 2030, but to 
achieve this, radical changes would need to be implemented. The current plan is to shut 
down all nuclear power stations, improve on energy efficiency and boost up the use of 
renewable energy. The use of renewable energy has risen from 11.3% in 2011 to 14% in 
2016, but the clearest rise has been in the rise of natural gas use. The use of natural gas 
is expected to rise considerably after the Nord Stream 2 pipeline becomes operational. 
The use of coal will also rise before the expansion of renewable energy sources 
becomes a reality  
 
The Energiewende dominated the German energy policy field prior to the Ukraine 
crisis, and linked energy security with domestic decision making. Energy security in 
Germany was understood as one linked with oil and gas market fluctuations, that might 
cause sharp peaks in the price of energy. Also, the price of Energiewende and massive 
changes to the electricity sector were immediate, and the nation’s energy grid was not 





the price of energy might rise, and cause damage to the German industry. This shows a 
sign that energy security was an economic concern, rather than strategic in 2011.  
 
Even though Russia’s actions after the Ukraine crisis were condemned by the German 
government and there were attempts of securitizing moves from both the media and 
political actor’s, Russian energy continued to be a desecuritized issue in Germany, and 
energy cooperation continues between Germany and Russia, notably via the Nord 
Stream 2 project. Russia did not, however, remain as a friend in official rhetoric of 
Germany, but many in Germany hoped that the special relationship could be saved. As 
according to Buzan & Wæver, Germany still saw Russia as a friend in trade relations, 
but a lost or misguided friend in political relations. According to Karl Deutsch and 
Alexander Wendt the image of Russia is perceived in Germany as a part of a 
“pluralistic commonwealth of security” 278 . Good relations with Russia are key to 
keeping peace and maintaining energy security, and although conflict is possible, 
Germany sees that their function is to be the appeaser between the West and East. 
Continuing energy trade with Russia was an economic relationship between companies, 
but also a diplomatic mission that Germany hopes will mend the rift between the two 
countries. The German industry and major politicians all strived to desecuritize Russian 
linked energy after the crisis and Angela Merkel herself supported the Nord Stream 2 
project despite showing strong leadership against Russian actions at the beginning of 
the crisis.  
 
Marco Siddi sees that Germany has not completely abandoned Ostpolitik and that there 
is still a desire within the German economic and political circles to return to the special 
relationship between Germany and Russia 279 . The German political elite, namely 
Angela Merkel and former chancellors and Prime Ministers, continue to diplomatically 
engage Russia, and the flow of gas and oil continues without problems. Germany is a 
leading figure in the mediation of the Ukraine crisis, and countries like Poland, that 
wish to expand the sanctions to include energy, have been excluded from the process. 
Siddi sees that Germany has updated their strategy, rather than abandoned it. The new 
Ostpolitik is a combination of diplomacy, economic cooperation and maintaining 
international norms 280 . This new Ostpolitik can be understood as a doctrine of 
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desecuritization of Russian energy, where the unhindered flow of gas and oil are the 
cornerstones of German economy and diplomacy between Germany and Russia. 
 
With Russian energy not included in the EU sanctions, Germany was able to continue 
its energy projects with Russia and maintained their view of Russia as a reliable trading 
partner. Russian energy was successfully desecuritized after the initial shock and energy 
dependency was played down as a threat to the country. Nuclear power continued to be 
securitized after the crisis, as was coal power for environmental reasons. As natural gas 
and oil were the only non-securitized energy sources available, Germany had no 
possibility but to block Polish attempts to include Russian gas or oil in the sanctions. 
German political doctrine was also strongly based on the idea that good relations with 
Russia are the key to energy security. Germany did not see that Russian energy became 
a risk or a threat after the Ukraine crisis. What happened in stead was a securitization of 
the possibility that Russian energy would stop if relations with Russia would deteriorate 
between Germany and Russia.  
 
Germany does not trust that Poland, with their securitized view of Russian energy, 
should stay as the main pathway of Russian energy, as this places Germany and their 
industry in a precarious situation where Polish-Russian relations would determine 
German energy security. Nord stream 2 is a way for Germany to safeguard their own 
energy security and energy self-determinations. Germany sees the Nord stream pipeline 
in its entirety as a vital part of their energy security, as it diversifies their transit routes, 
and cuts out the middle man. The crisis in Ukraine, the hostile Polish-Russian relations 
and the aging eastern European gas and oil transit infrastructure were in German eyes a 
greater energy security concerns than any dependency on Russian energy.  
 
Germany has a strong view that renewable energy is not a threat to energy security, on 
the contrary they see it as the answer to energy security issues281. They see nuclear 
power as a threat to both environmental and energy security, even though greenhouse 
gas emissions and dependency on Russian gas and oil is brought up frequently in 
German media, and climate change is a securitized issue. Anti-Nuclear views have 
always been much more popular in Germany, than in other EU member states, and the 
2011 Fukushima disaster caused enough public outcry to force the government to 
                                                 





abandon nuclear power entirely. Germany does not see that their domestic energy 
policies are anything other than internal policy decisions and are strongly against any 
other EU member state meddling in their internal policy issues282. The lack of internal 
transit infrastructure is a major threat to German plans to make renewable energy the 
major energy source in the entire country, and the expansion of the use of shale gas is 
on hold, as it is viewed as a competitor of renewable energy. All in all Germany 
maintains a view that all energy security threats can be answered via technology, new 
infrastructure and by turning Germany into a transit state.283 
 
Currently Germany seems to have no clear way of cutting their import dependency, but 
as seen in the reactions of German politician and industry representatives to the Ukraine 
crisis and EU sanctions, there are many who do not see import dependency as a threat or 
even a risk. The change through interdependency doctrine sees that dependency goes 
both ways, and if Germany is able to become the main transit country of Russian gas 
into Europe, Germany could use their transit country status to strengthen their bilateral 
relations with Russia and use their importance as an energy importer as a diplomatic 
tool. The threat of Russian energy dependency is played down in Ostpolitik thinking, 
but as Wæver has pointed out, desecuritization could hamper Germany’s ability to 
counter possible threats in the near future284. 
 
7.3 Poland 
Poland reduces their total TPES from 101 Mtoe in 2011, to 94.6 Mtoe in 2015, with the 
use of fossil fuels decreasing and the amount of renewables increasing. Currently 
Poland is the second largest importer of energy in the region, but they are also one of 
least energy import dependent EU member states. Poland does import nearly all of their 
oil and gas from Russia, but this number has been reducing year by year. The amount of 
oil imports reduced from 96% in 2012 to 83.7% in 2016, and Poland aims to cut their 
natural gas trade with Russia all together by 2022, by a combination of LNG terminals, 
shale gas and connecting to other natural gas producing countries like Norway.  
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Before the Ukraine crisis Poland did not hold Russian linked energy as much of a threat, 
but more of a risk. Energy security was, however, a major part of Polish energy policy 
agenda as Russian energy dependency was a common topic, as was the aging 
infrastructure and the lack of diversity of energy supplies. The goal was that Poland 
could reinforce their energy security via new energy connections and by utilizing 
nuclear power, domestic energy sources and new renewable energy sources. Both the 
German Energiewende and the EU climate regulations were seen as risks for Poland’s 
energy security, but the issue was not yet seen as acute and instead the Polish 
government worked through EU channels to try and affect the decisions to their favor. 
There was yet no need for a direct governmental oversight of energy policy in Poland, 
and energy markets were liberalized.  
 
The Ukraine crisis caused Poland to view Russian energy as a traditional security threat, 
and the threat of energy disruptions became a key part of Polish foreign and defense 
policy. To combat Russian energy dependency effectively Poland saw that the entire EU 
needs to work together to achieve energy security, and the German Energiewende was 
believed to undermine the energy security of the entire EU. This is most evident in the 
number of Polish academic articles criticizing German plans of greenhouse gas 
reduction, nuclear phase out and natural gas purchases from Russia285. The riskification 
soon developed into full securitization of energy in Poland, and total governmental 
oversight and protective measures were put in place. This slow movement towards 
securitization of energy in Poland, coincides with Szuleckis view that energy does not 
necessarily need a speech act to be securitized, but is in fact a mechanism. The 
Copenhagen school version of securitization does somewhat, however, work with 
Poland, as there were clear speech acts to identify the threat, actions taken to prevent it 
and the breaking free of rules. There was not, however, a single speech act, as the Polish 
energy policy field had been moving towards securitization for some time, and the 
Ukraine crisis was a transition point where Russian energy turned from a risk to a 
threat. Energy had been exceptionalized in Poland even before the crisis, and, as 
according to Szuleckis view, when it unfolded Poland’s interpretation of the event led to 
total securitization of energy. This gives stronger support for the idea of energy 
securitization being a mechanism. 
 
                                                 





Poland placed domestic energy, new energy connections and EU cooperation as the key 
methods of obtaining energy security. They tried to create a regional security complex 
within the EU by securitizing Russian energy but were met with limited success. The 
Energy Union was approved, but not as the energy security-based institution they 
hoped. The inner markets and the upholding of security of supply did pass and were 
successfully riskified by the EU around the security of energy supplies, but the main 
goal of common gas purchases was strongly opposed by many other member states and 
did not become a part of the final version of the Energy Union. Poland had hoped that 
the Energy Union would allow them to continue their own energy policy track, and at 
the same time spread their securitized vision of energy security to other member states. 
Poland needed to form a regional security complex around Russian energy, as Poland 
could not maintain energy security if other EU member states continued to push for 
strong climate policy initiatives, that harmed Polish domestic coal industry, and 
continued to purchase their gas and oil from Russia bilaterally.  
 
Nord stream 2 pipeline shows how strongly securitized Russian natural gas became in 
Poland. The Polish view is that the project will harm Poland, Ukraine and the entire EU. 
The fact that Germany chose to continue the project after the Ukraine crisis caused 
Poland to view Germany as much of an energy security threat as Russia. Being in a key 
position between central Europe and Russia, Poland has benefited from being a key 
transit route of oil and gas. Poland sees any alternative gas or oil pipelines not only as 
economic threats but as security threats. Being a transit country has given Poland 
considerable leverage against Russia in gas disputes, but any alternative routes would 
eliminate Poland’s ability to stand against Russia, being itself dependent on Russian gas 
and oil. Although Poland is not as dependent on Russian gas and oil as some other EU 
member states, they are in a worse position when it comes to energy infrastructure, 
alternative sources of energy, development of renewable energy and connections to 
European energy markets. 
 
The NAS 2020 showed how Poland is able to implement EU climate policy, but it too 
had a security policy-oriented angle. NAS 2020 saw the development of renewable 
energy sources as the way to update the country’s aging energy infrastructure and which 
could help in cutting dependency to Russian fossil fuels. The updating of the energy 





green coal power plants, but the phasing down of coal power is not up for debate. 
Poland has securitized nearly all their energy resources after the crisis, but there is still 
debate if renewable energy is an energy security threat or if it’s the solution to the 
threat. Currently Poland views renewable energy as a hinderance and a distraction that 
takes valuable resources away from more pressing threats than climate change. There is 
also the risk that Poland could become technologically dependent on Germany and be 
sucked in the same problems that have engulfed Germany after Energiewende, namely 
greater dependency on Russian natural gas. 
 
7.4 Comparative analysis 
The reasons for securitization, desecuritization or riskification of Russian energy vary 
significantly between the three member states. There are geographical, economical, 
sociological, cultural, political and technical reasons how states choose the logic and the 
way of application of energy policy.  
 
7.4.1 Energy Security 
Finland sees energy security interlinked with EU energy and climate policy and sees 
energy security as a part of security policy. There is an understanding that energy 
security is both low vulnerability of vital energy systems, but also that energy security 
needs affordability and reliability which shows in the Finnish view that cheap Russian 
energy is needed but should also be seen as a possible risk. Here Finland’s 
understanding of Russian energy coincides with Polands securitized view, but unlike 
Poland, Finland does not view all Russian linked energy with distrust, but only fossil 
fuels. 
 
German energy security is to continue the flow of affordable and reliable energy by 
securing their energy systems by taking control of the transit infrastructure, effectively 
bypassing Poland and Ukraine. This in turn is seen as an attack on Poland’s energy 
security as Poland sees their energy security as all-encompassing, with the security of 
domestic energy production and transit infrastructure as the main vital energy systems. 
Germany does not have as strong of a view of the importance of diversification as 
Finland or Poland has, and renewable energy is the main German method of gaining 





affordable second option. Germany sees nuclear power in the same way that Poland sees 
renewable energy; a threat to the development and expansion of other energy sources.  
 
Poland sees energy security as a key part of their national security policy with domestic 
energy sources, EU cooperation and gas and oil pipelines being the most important 
aspects of Polish energy security together with domestic coal. Climate policy is 
subservient to energy security and is even viewed as a competitor to energy security. 
The reliability of energy is an important part of this, and Poland is willing to see the 
affordability of energy drop to achieve total energy security from Russia. Poland and 
Finland see Russian linked energy as more of a threat and agree on nuclear energy being 
the answer to energy dependency, as is the utilization of domestic energy sources. In 
order to secure Poland’s energy security, they would need to keep their status as the 
main transit country, and make sure that all other EU member states join together to 
combat Russian energy domination. Finland differs from Poland in the fact that they 
want to maintain trade relations with Russia as part of their diplomacy, a view which 
Poland does not share.  
 
Energy projects with Russia are an important part of Finland’s bilateral relations with 
Russia, and the Fennovoima nuclear powerplant project has very similar reasoning 
behind it as Germany has with Nord Stream 2. Unlike Germany, Finland understands 
that they would be in no position to counter Russian geoeconomic actions if the level of 
dependency would become higher. Alternative sources of energy are needed from 
nearby countries, domestic energy sources must be utilized, and diversification must be 
achieved to maintain energy security. The Finnish and German views on Nord Stream 2 
also show that Polish energy security concerns are not shared amongst other member 
states, rather both Germany and Finland view their own interests lying in continuous 
energy trade with Russia, although in Finland’s case this only applies to nuclear energy. 
Germany has a strong view that energy security means continuous energy trade with 
Russia, and the end of this trade would be a disaster for German industry and energy 
security. 
 
Unlike Poland, Finland does not have the necessary domestic energy resources to 
completely rid themselves of Russian energy, but both countries understand the 





security of supply as holding the necessary stocks, diversification of energy supplies 
and averting energy dependency on Russian fossil fuels, but at the same time not 
severing all their energy ties so not to create a political crisis between the two countries. 
Finland sees energy trade with Russia as an important part of bilateral relations in the 
same way as Germany. Poland has all the necessary domestic fossil fuels they need to 
cut their dependency, but this goes against the EU climate change regulations. Publicly 
Finland sees the reductions in fossil fuel use as part of the EU greenhouse gas emission 
reduction goals which could mean that they see the goals as a handy way of reducing 
Russian imported fossil fuels without harming bilateral relations.  
 
The Finnish government utilizes their partially state-owned energy companies in a 
similar kind of fashion as Germany; a way to bypass political scrutiny by making 
energy projects a part of the free market and thus politically insulated. Fortum and 
Fennovoima are both partially state owned, as are German energy companies of Uniper 
and Wintershall, and both countries use the same method of justifying bilateral energy 
trade: the corporations are the ones taking part in the projects, not the governments. 
Poland has taken complete control of their energy market from the free market, and 
energy policy is dictated by the government. Political control of energy policy is present 
in all of the three member states, but Polish political control is the most direct. Finland 
and Germany steer the national energy policies towards their objectives via state owned 
corporations and political decision making.   
 
 
7.4.2 Securitization/Desecurtization /Riskification of Russian energy 
For Finland Russian energy is riskified, as there is some level of acceptance of 
dependency, beyond which the issue becomes a threat. The 60% EU ownership in the 
Fennovoima nuclear powerplant project for example follows Olaf Corrys view of 
riskification, as it is a way of building in a safety margin for Russian energy ownership. 
Finland also sees limiting Russian fossil fuel use and diversifying their energy base as a 
way to build national resilience which is the main way of combating long term risks. 
The audiences in Finland are generally on the line of riskification, but the scientific 
audience is very close to being securitized. The elite, popular and technocratic 
audiences all follow general desecuritized/riskified approaches, where the threat of 






For Germany Russian energy is desecuritized, and there is a strong view in Germany 
that the securitization or riskification of Russian energy is itself a threat. Energy is a 
commodity and part of economic policy rather than security policy, but the government 
does have their own goals of reaching the necessary greenhouse gas reduction goals of 
the Energy Concept and making sure that bilateral energy trade with Russia can 
continue uninterrupted. The dominant view is that currently there is no alternative to 
Russian gas or oil, and that any actions taken to securitize them will in fact bring about 
the energy crisis that securitization or riskification of the issue would try to prepare for. 
Germany hopes that by deepening their dependency to Russia, they would in turn 
become too important of a trading partner for Russia which in turn would discourage 
Russia from using energy as a geoeconomic tool. In the long run, Germany might also 
hope that the Russian energy will be reduced when the Energy Concept is developed 
further. The German audiences are almost unanimously desecuritized, with only a few 
instances of riskification, by the media and academics. The early parts of the Ukraine 
crisis saw some speech acts aimed at securitizing Russian energy, but even Angela 
Merkel, who was strongly against Russian actions in Ukraine, sided with the 
desecuritized view of Russian energy. 
 
Russian energy was completely securitized in Poland after the Ukraine crisis, and unlike 
Finland, Poland did not wish to continue bilateral trade relations with Russia on any 
energy projects. Russian energy needed to be completely phased out, and Poland used 
exceptional methods to gain the necessary governmental control to achieve this. The 
new ministry of energy gave the Polish government total control of the energy sphere in 
the country and reduced the liberalization of the energy market. EU climate policy was 
no longer a concern for Poland, as the country aims to increase domestic coal and gas 
use. Polish audiences are the polar opposite of that of Germany, and the elite, popular, 
technocratic and scientific audiences all show signs of securitization. The scientific 
audience critizises German energy policy, the popular view is very strongly against 
Russian energy domination and support domestic coal use, and the technocratic and 






7.4.3 Energy Union 
A common EU energy policy is something that all of the three member states wanted, 
and saw as necessary for European energy security. The Energy Union was welcomed 
by all as a major project, but there were, however, major internal differences on the 
nature of the Energy Union, and what a common energy policy should be. 
 
Germany and Finland saw the Energy Union as a way to form a much stronger internal 
energy market in the EU and open up a forum in which energy policy could be 
discussed. Germany especially wanted the Energy Union to move forwards climate 
change mitigation plans. The Energy Union could also be used to create stronger 
integration and move towards a common understanding of energy policy in the EU. 
Finland saw that the Energy Union is necessary to achieve energy security, and even 
saw that it must have a major say in the energy relations of member states and Russia. 
For Poland a common EU energy policy is needed to secure their domestic energy 
security, as the EU is the only institution that could stop Germany from diminishing 
their status as a transit country. Bilateral energy trade with Russia is also seen by Poland 
as something that harms all European states equally as it pushes countries against one 
another and makes it impossible for domestic energy sources to compete with cheap 
Russian fossil fuels.  
 
7.4.3.1 Energy Union a sign of an RSC? 
To see if the Energy Union has been the result of a regional security complex built 
around Russian energy dependency the member states will now be examined via the 4 
variables:  
1) Boundary: The main boundary of the EU runs along the EU-Russia border with 
Finland and Poland both being boundary states where as Germany is not. The 
Nord Stream 2 project will effectively turn Germany into a boundary state as the 
direct connection of energy without transit states will turn Russian-German 
relations into a direct energy relation. Finland and Poland, however, differ in 
their view of bilateral relations to Russia but converge in many ways in their 
views on Russian energy. Unlike Poland, Finland does not see that bilateral 
energy trade with Russia should be completely stopped and see their energy 






2) Anarchic structure: The EU comprises of 28-member states, with each state 
having their own energy policies and political alliances. Finland continues to see 
Russian bilateral relations as an important part of their economic and security 
policy. Finland is a member of the Nord pool and the Nordic cooperation but is 
also trying to expand southward to link their energy network with the Baltic 
region. Germany is the de-facto leader of the EU, especially after the Ukraine 
crisis, and most member states in the EU follow Germany’s path when it comes 
to renewable energy development and foreign policy relating to Russia 
(sanctions, but continuing bilateral energy relations). Germany does, however, 
see their relations with Russia as a special relationship and although being the 
spiritual leader of the EU, they distance themselves from the Union when doing 
bilateral relations with Russia. Poland is the leader of the Visegrad group and 
has since the Ukraine crisis pushed for their own security and energy policy 
interpretations in the EU via the Energy Union. Poland and the Visegrad group 
form a distinct political entity within the EU which is often at odds with the EU 
over greenhouse gas reduction goals but are split over the role of Russian 
energy.  
 
3) Polarity: The strength between the member states vary significantly, with 
Germany having the most political and economic power in the EU. Finland is a 
relatively weak member state, and they tend to follow Germany’s lead on energy 
and climate policy. Poland has a strong position within the Visegrad group, but 
in the EU, they are in the minority when it comes to political and economic 
power. Their securitized vision of Russian energy and energy security are not 
shared by most member states and they do not have the necessary political 
power to shape the Energy Union into the RSC they vision. 
 
4) Social construction: Both Germany and Poland see each other’s vision of energy 
policy as problematic and as a threat to their own energy security. Finland and 
Germany agree on most areas, especially with bilateral Russian energy trade, but 
Finland also has apprehensions of Russian energy dependency along the lines of 
Poland. The Energy Union is thus understood very differently by all three-
member states. Poland views it as a tool to unify EU energy policy to combat 





economic forum which will create a unified EU energy market and guide the 
development of renewable energy sources. It will not, however, affect national 
energy policy decision beyond this or hamper bilateral energy trade, as long as 
the Energy Union does not include ways of enforcing member states to limit 
their use of Russian fossil fuels. 
 
These variables show that the Energy Union is not in fact a sign of a centered RSC 
development within the EU, but rather a sign of internal transformation towards greater 
disintegration and enmity among the units. The Ukraine crisis showed that the view on 
Russian energy is split between those that view it as a threat (Poland), those that see it 
as a risk (Finland) and those that view it as desecuritized and a necessary part of EU 
energy security (Germany). Poland has already shown signs that it has securitized 
Russian linked energy and has split to form its own sub-RSC around this perceived 
threat. Even though Finland is a boundary state and see Russian energy as a risk, they 
see their position as far too precarious and their domestic energy security includes good 
relations with Russia. The German line of energy cooperation seems to be the best 
option to keep Finland from alienating themselves within the EU (e.g Poland), and to 
maintain their energy security. Germany will continue to push their vision of energy 
trade which is that every member state can form their own bilateral energy trade 
relations with Russia, if they follow EU climate policy and do not meddle in other 
member states energy policy. The unhindered flow of energy to the EU is the main goal 
of Germany, at least as long as the Energiewende reaches its goal of total renewable 
energy production. This will push Poland further into its own view of securitized 
Russian energy, and it has already shown signs that Germany, and maybe even 
countries like Finland, are a threat to their domestic energy security, as well as to EU 
energy security. This shows that Judge and Maltby’s view of securitization leading to 
greater disintegration can happen. This has been caused by the rise of energy 
securitization in Poland, but also by the completely different interpretations of the 
energy security by countries like Germany and Finland.  
 
The Energy Union will continue allowing states to purchase energy from Russia 
bilaterally, and focuses its efforts on slowly developing diversification of energy 





member states like Poland which wish to see a more assertive Energy Union and a 
unified EU response against Russian energy domination. 
 
8 Conclusions 
The Ukraine crisis showed that politically all the member states had a common view on 
Russian aggression, but there were major differences about Russian energy after the 
crisis. Energy dependency was a major talking point in all of the member states, but the 
actions needed to combat it, or not, were not uniform.  
 
The Ukraine crisis showed Finland that there is a threat related to Russian fossil fuels, 
such as gas, coal or oil which could in theory be used as a geoeconomical weapon. 
Nuclear energy was not seen as an immediate threat, but more of a potential risk which 
after consideration by the government was deemed a necessary risk. The country’s 
energy security would be achieved by securing Russian-Finnish relations via common 
energy projects and by diversifying the energy base of the country to such an extent that 
no single energy source could be used as leverage.  
 
Germany was shocked by the Ukraine crisis, and there was a period of political and 
social contemplation if its vision of change through interdependency had been 
misguided or not. The German government had successfully pushed their own 
securitized view of climate change to the EU, but they were unsure if Russian linked 
energy and dependency were a threat to them or the EU. When the time came to 
formulate the sanctions, Germany had chosen to follow the old doctrine, and was able to 
use their power in the EU to exclude Russian energy from both the sanctions and shape 
the Energy Union to better suit their needs. This was either because Germany could not 
sever energy ties to Russia without doing considerable harm to themselves after the 
Energiewende, or because there was still the hope that by monopolizing energy 
dependency to just Germany, they could gain the power to dictate energy policy 
between the EU and Russia, without having to rely on other member states with 
different ideas of energy policy. The nation’s energy security and security of supply 
would be achieved by taking Germany deeper into Russian energy dependency, hoping 






Poland saw that they were proven correct by the Ukraine crisis, and that their 
securitized vision of Russia and Russian energy was vindicated. There were major 
internal developments inside Poland to push for further production of domestic energy 
sources, and all energy policy decisions were placed under governmental control. 
Poland began to boldly push their vision of energy security to the rest of Europe, and 
met with some early success, but were cut short from achieving a united EU energy 
policy based on their values. After the failure to achieve the unified energy policy in 
Europe Poland began to view German energy policy not only as a rival to their vision 
but as a threat to the energy security of the entire EU. The goal was to continue pushing 
for the more securitized view of energy policy, and at the same time secure Poland’s 
energy security by ridding the country of all Russian linked energy by any means 
necessary, even if it meant failing the EU climate change mitigation plans and creating a 
conflicting sub-RSC within the EU.  
 
The Energy Union in its current form does not lead to a unified EU regional security 
complex and energy policy integration. It is a compromise between very different 
member states, with their own interpretations of energy security. The Energy Union has 
its roots in Polish energy securitization, but the different interpretations of what is 
needed for energy security and the variations in vital energy systems and socio-
economic environments make it even after the Ukraine crisis an impossible task to unite 
the EU member states behind a common energy security threat. The original securitized 
moves made by Poland did not lead to this securitization of Russian energy spreading in 
the EU.  
 
The points in the Energy Union agreement can be used to mitigate both Russian linked 
energy, and climate change if a state wishes so, but it does not require any member state 
to change their own energy policy or give the EU a unified response to Russian energy 
domination.  
 
The results of the study show that the energy policies of different EU member states can 
have huge repercussions on the integrity of the EU. There is a clear need for a unified 
EU energy policy, but as was shown in this study that can’t be achieved without 
harming either energy sovereignty or energy security. Energy security needs of member 





take, it will alienate many member states as it will, in their view, undermine their 
domestic energy security. The EU needs to strengthen the Energy Union so that it may 
stop member states from harming one another’s energy security, but also work towards 
a common EU energy policy that takes the energy security needs and threats into equal 
consideration. The Energy Union already works as a forum in which member states can 
discuss energy security issues. It remains to be seen if a common understanding of 
European energy security can emerge as the wedge of Russian energy has divided the 
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